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ABSTRACT
This vol.ume t Environmental Analysing presents the results of the
analysis of the external -!environment of the FBI Fingerprint
Identification Division. It projects possible trends in the future
environment oi;"the Division that may have an effect on the work l.oady
to determine a,f future work load will lie within the capability range
of the proposed new ,system, AIDS III, as set out in the AIDS ITT.
Desi.gu Guidelines. Two working models of the environment are
developedp the internal and external model, and from these scenarios
are developed that lead to projection of possible future work load
volume and mixture. Possible drivers of work load change are
identified and assessed for upper and lower bounds of effects. Data
used for the study were derived from historical informations analysis
of the current situations and from interviews with various agencies
who are users of or stakeholders in the present system. Forr,.a
synopsis of this entire report, see the Executive Summary in the
Compendium (Volume I).
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INTRODUCTION t SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A	 SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF EVALUATION
As described in Volume I of this report, the Jot PropulsiQo
Laboratory, in agreement with the National Aeronsutios and Spiace
Administration, has contracted with the Department of Justice:, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, to evaluate the feasibility of the planned
automation of the fingerprint identification process » An essential
element of the feasibility analysis of the system is an estimation of
the ability of the proposed automated fingerprint identification
system to adapt to change. Sensitivity analysis was chosen by JPL as
the appropriate methodology to test the adaptabilityrof the proposed.
system.
This report summarizes a study provided as analytic framework
for the evajuation of the prime contractor, Rockwell International's
planned Automated Identification Division System Model III (AIDS
Ill). The s ubject matter of this volume is the environment of the
Division: the investigation and assessment of (1) the trends and
forces now present in the collection of agencies and institutions that
use and control the functions services and internal procedure of the
Division and are judged able to lead to change in its existing
pat erns; and. (2) the forces and trends in the society in which these
organizati>ons are imbedded tb,^ can have similar effects.f
For this purposep the Identification Division must be considered
in its central role as an information bys tem, To characterize such a
system it is necessary to describe the techctical aspects of
information that flows through it, the sources of data, the methods of
collecting, processing, storing and distributing information, the uses
to which it is and can be put, and the needs and purposes of the
users, (Much of this necessary analysis is reported in other volumes
of this study, and subsequent sectio►is of th is volume deal with the
3	
latter two topics only in terms of the possibility and likelihood of
change arising there.)
It is not enough to analyze the ponsibilit,y and likelihood of
change in terms of the existing structure of the Division as an
information sy.etem. What is needed is the analysis of the structural
changes that are likely to be imposed on Khe system by forces and
pressures arising from within the agencies that use and control the
information services: agencies that have little if any stake in the
preservation and enhancement of the present system. This analysis
does not include (and was not intended to include) estimates of"the
value of the various kinds of information supplied to the users and of
the social value of the services provided by the users themselves. 'a
study that has never been undertaken at least partly because the
necessary data are not available Thus. instead of the ideally
complete study that would have included the assessment of structural
ZIP& , Vi It rt: t
system capable of economic and operational efficiency # the study
reported here has necessarily been limited to the assessment of
existing pressures for structural change.
B	 OBJECTIVES
rj
The objectives of the analysis have been to determine the user	 I
community and the stakeholders in that community, those agencies,
institutions and office;"that may have an effect on the system; and to
investigate these and other users who are potential drivers of
change: the national criminal justice system, Congress, and the
executive and judicial branches of the United Statos Government.
Assessment was made of the nature of the changes than these
stakeholders might initiate. This assessment was required to be both
qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative results could then be
used as source of dynamics for the sensitivity analysis.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the primary objective of the analys so to
determine whether changes in the external environment would lead to a
work load greater than AIDS III c),pabilit,ies. Specifically, the
objective is to establish upper and lower !pounds of projected use of
the national, personal identification service provided by the Division
and to determine the most likely projections lying between these
bounds. These projections can then be used for sensitivity testing of 	 l
the system. Figure 1-2 shows the work load projection specified by
the Division to Rockwell for sizing the AIDS III: system.
Figure 1-3 graphically depicts five scenarios which are
discussed later in this report. Thece scenarios lead to the work load
projections illustrated in Figure 1-4. Figure 1-4 also depicts the
trends that can be hypothesized and may be substantiated by supporting
research, In order to test the sensitivity of the system to change,
the dynamic range of the variability of projected work load must be
ascertained and verified.
The changes in work load may be characterized by a variety of
trends. The most important trends are those that appear most likely
to occur, based on the totality of the data collected for the study.
Historical data have been used, where possible, to project future
trends in 'work load. The period of most interest for the study is
from the present to 2004, the end of the 25-year life cycle. The date
of the full capability of the automated system, 1993, is also of
significant interest.
C.	 STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS
1.	 Characterization of the Environment
The following sections of this report are organized into two
different subsets. The first, titled 'The Intp-rnal Model,"* discusses
*The title "Internal Model" corresponds to the perception of the
environment from a viewpoint inside the Identification Division.
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changes required for the achievement of h6 effective informaelon the
magnitude and likelihood of direct changes in the work load of the
Division. This analysis is directed toward estimating the impacts of
observable trends; demographic, economic, social and politicalp on the
volume, distribution,-and mixture of the types of submissions and
inquiries of the work lead and on the functions performed within the
identification process. The comparison of those estimates with the
estimated capabilities of the present system and AIDS III is discussed
in Volume IV. As a part of this analysis, the consequences of a set
of "scenarios" desr'ribing possible alternative patterns for the work
load are assigned "quantitative values and :o,mrwared with the
appropriate measured for AIDS III. Th6se, vaOxts are chiefly; based on
historical data.
i
The second, a more critical and relevant section deals with what
is termed "The External Model." In this model, the governance and
control of the operations of the Identification Division are explored
and the focus and techniques of that control are investigated, with
the specific omission of the foregoing assumption that the structure
of present operations is unchanged. In this part of the study,
indications have been sought of forces present in the internal and
external environment of the Division that can lead to changes in
structure as well as in the volume and distribution of the existing
work load. Qualitative assessments have also been carried out on the
direction and magnitude of these forces.
a. Internal Model * The internal model (Figure 1-5) is
relatively simple. Users of Identification Division services submit
requests for services in response to trends and events in the users'
environments. Interaction between users and the Division is limited
to (1) submissions and replies to submissions, (2) the imposition or
removal of regulations on submissions according to the constraints of
the operWion. Both changes in policy and trends affecting rates of
submissions are assumed to be associated with the users' environment.
The impact of these changes and trends is assumed to be entirely
embodied in the work load of submissions.
b. External Model. In contrast to the internal model, the
external model is necessarily complex to take account of both the
pressures that act as drivers of change in the relationships between
the Division and the triers of its services, and the actions of
government agencies that also act as drivers of change upon the
Division. The characteristics of the external model are also
diagrammed in Figure 1-5.
In the external model, the Identification Division itself is
included as one of the drivers that can produce change in both the
distribution and volume of work load received and in the kind of
services it supplies to other external environment members.
€
	
	 Clearly, although critically different approaches have been
taken in the two different analyses, there is considerable
interdependence between the subject matter and the results of the two,'
and neither is fully complete without the other.
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Data collect	 for the two different models and the methodologies
applied for the analysis are necessarily very different and thus will
be discussed separately in the appropriate sections that follow.
Briefly, the two different analyses are distinguished by the use of
quantitative data and numerical./statistical analysis in the internal
model and the collection of largely verbal responses from interviews
and their analysis under the rubrics of organization theory in the
external model.
2.	 Elements of the Analysis
study:
following essential elements of analysis were used in the
(a)
(b)
Determination of the drivers defined as the social
trends, policies and interactions capable of producing
work load changes in the environment.
Assessment of the principal origins of these drivers
classified as technological, economic, political
legislative, demographic, arising from possible events,
and others.
Determination of the direction (increase or decrease) and
magnitude of the changes produced by each potential driver.
Assessment of the probability of the manifestation of
change from each driver and of the concomitant effects.
Descriptions of the ways in which will these
manifestations will come about, and the additional
external drivers they will set in motion.
Development of scenarios to characterize the underlying
causal relationships, and analysis of the consequences of
these scenarios.
3.	 Definition of User and Stakeholder Groups
The user and stakeholder groups were defined as:
(a) The national criminal justice system and, specifically,
state identification bureaus and local law enforcement
agencies.
(b) National banks operated under federal charter.
(c) Security firms, especially those. under Security and
Exchange Commission regulation.
(d) Military recruiters.
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(e) Th^ Federal Government and, specifically, the Office of
Personnel Management.
(f) Other employers requiring clearances for prospective
employees.
Ii
k.	 Research Strategy
The research strategy consisted of:
(a)	 Identification of users and stakeholders.
(b)	 Analysis of their use of the identification system.
(c)	 Collection of data by the use of:
(1) Quest ionna ire s.
(2) interview.
(3) Documentary research.
(d)	 Analyses of the data, including:
(1) ; 01entification of common themes.
(2) Development of working models.
(3) Verification of the working hypotheses.
(e)	 Generation of implications of future trends.
(f) Assignment of probabilities to outcomes.
(g)	 Composition of scenarios.
D.	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Overview
Results of the analyses of the two different models are
remarkably similar, and as noted above, interdependent. Both yield a
description of the Identification Division as being ic'a "steady
state," with a work load unlikely to be subject to large or abrupt
changes for the near future (ten to fifteen years hence)y and with an
absence of external pressures that would induce structural change in
its organization and operations.
2. Outline of Conclusions
a.	 From Analysis of the Internal Model. Existing economic,
demographic and political trends can be securely projected only to
1-10
tt
t
3
jfollow recent historical patterns that reflect a ,general slowing of
growth in demographic and economic indiegtors and a tendency toward
"centrism" in the political arena 0 with political stasis evident in
legislative and executive actions corresponding to the absence of /'
clear consensus on the majority of political j^'ssues that can affect
the needs for identification services. The (effects on the work load
of the Identification Division are thus projected to be minimal, so
that work loads in the future are judged very likely to follow
patterns of the recent past, and in only one case to exceed the limits
plus or minus SOX of the 1993 projected work load of the Identification
Division, as stated in AIDS ICI Guidelines. See Figures 1-2 through 1-4.
Major changes in the work load could be imposed by the passage	 (rl
of particular laws in Congress, specifically a law requiring the
registration of some or all individually-owned firearms with the
accompanying fingerprinting of owners or new purchasers, or a law
establishing a national identification for employment program making
the fingerprinting of all U.S. , residents mandatory (see Figure 1-4).
In either case, the assignment to the Identification Division of the
task of collecting, processing, storing and distribufJ ng the required
identification materials could not be accomplished without massive
structural changes in the Division that would require reorganization
t	 on a large scale.
Events such as the declaration of wax, the outbreak of
widespread violence, the institution of a peace-time draft of
civilians and the like cannot by ruled out as impossible, but their
occurence within a specified period of time cannot be assigned any but
a highly subjective and speculative probability. Moreover, hike the
prospective national laws mentioned above, the impact of these events
on the processing of identification data for individuals would in many
cases require structural change in order to continue the
centralization of identification within the Division.
Major technological innovations in either identification itself*
or the processes of collectling, processing, storing and distributing
fingerprint identificatioa information is seen to be in process on the
basis of observed research and appl'11,cations for research. However,
the adoption of either kind of new technology by the Division within
the relatively near future is judged` ;very unlikely.
None of 'the scenarios developed to describe alternative
reasonable paths of increase or decrease in the work load of the
Division led to an estimate that lay outside the limits of the AIDS
III Guidelines except for one projection which excteds the + 50% (see
Figure 1-2) bound very near the projected end of the life cycle of the
proposed system, i.e., 2004 (see Figure 1-4).
*Possible new technologies include voice prints, blood typing, the use
of molecular biological techniques, etc.
f%
b.	 From Analysis of the External Model. The actual
environment of user agencies, legislative )executive and judicial
agencies, federal and state agencies, and stakeholders of various
kinds in which the Identification Division operates is characterized
by wide diversity in scale, purpose and organizational structure and
by a diffusion of control of the uses of identification information
corresponding to the diversity in purpose and structure.
Although the majority of activities associated with fingerprint
identification come from state and local agencies (53X), the use of
the services of the Division by these agencies resists coherent
analysis. Moreover, although crude measures of comparative use by
individual states can be calculated, the determinants of such use are
idiosyncratic and characterized by an impenetrably complex set of
historical ) regional., geographic, legal and social conditions that
cannot usefully be grouped to yield multi-state subsets. Submission
of information and inquiries for information addressed by state and
local agencies to the Identification Division are only partly governed
by statute or regulation. Such uses in fact have been found to be
largely if not wholly discretionary and are correspondingly widely
variable among states, Control of the volume and distribution of the
work load of the Division by users is correspondingly complex and
diffuse, with the controls available to the Division itself limited by
regulatory restrictions.
Control of the Division as a government agency is assigned to
other Agencies in the executive hierarchy (the Department of Just)'ce
and the Office of Management and Budget) and to Congress in its
constitutional responsibility for national laws and the federal
budget. These agencies in turn are responsive to coherent pressures
from local, state and regional interests, from stakeholders
characterized by various degrees of organization, and to the federal;
judiciary. Control is directly exercised either by fiscal mechanisms
that increase or decrease the funds available for the Division or by
policy embodied in legislation or federal regulations.
Although change in either the work load or the structure of the
Division could be initiated through the mechanisms controlled by other
agencies, no evidence of the necessary conditions for such initiatives
was observed in the extensive review of existing and planned policies
that was undertaken for the study.
Indirect control of the work load and the structure of the
Division could be exercised by coalitions of state agencies and/or
local agencies organized to bring pressure to bear on Congress or the
Executive. However, this initiative is judged to be unlikely on the
basis of a review of existing policies and planning at the state and
local level as well as on the basis of the observed diversity of
concern at those levels with (1) the use of identification generally
and (2) the use of the identification services of the Division
specifically,
1=12
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Despite some evidence of dissatisfaction with the services they
receive, overall  the agencies and institutions that compose the
external environment of the Identification Division and that have the
capability of initiating changed there were found to give very low
priority to formulating new polices likely to affect the work load or
structure of the Division.
Changes directed at the identification Division as an organiza-
tional entity within the FBI were found to be unlikely because of the
quagmire of economic, technival and political considerations they would
be likely to produce. Instead, eviden;e was found that change in the
assignment of existing functions, tdp^tification and record keeping,
is already under consideration in the National Criminal information
Center (NCIC) and trials of programs to test the reassignment of
criminal history record keeping away from its ;locus in the NCIC are
currently in process.
,--I
1
^13
r
Gt
1
SECTION II
ZNVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS$ THE 'INTERNAL. MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
As described in Section I f two parallel but related
investigations have been undertaken in the study of the environment of
the Identification Division. Of these, the internal viewpoint of the
Division was modeled to focus on the chairactaristics of the present
work load of the Division and on the patterns it has displayed over
the past ten years for which hLotorical information is available. In
this approach, the Identification Division was considered as an
essentially autonomous ageocy, with a Work load determined primarily
by the demands of outside users for the various identification
services and with the requirements of the users determined in turn by
the circumstances of their external environments. This view
corresponds to the model previously diagrammed in figure 1-5, the
"internal model."*
B. METHODOLOGY
The methodology for the study of the internal model, has had
quantitative analysis as its principle thrust. The relatveiy
arbitrary scheme of classification for components of the work load is
based on some necessary simplifications that permitted a more coherent
and accessible presentation of the results, but care has been taken in
applying the classification so that important distinctions would not
be obscured. In addition to the analysis of quantitative data on the
characteristics of the work load, this part of the study has made use
of information supplied by experienced staff members of the
Identification Division itself and of other sections of the Bureau.
Their perceptions have been taken as the basis for the selection of a
comprehensive collection of trends, policies and events that can have
effects on the volume and distribution of the existing work load.
These trends have been titled "drivers." The information supplied by
the examination of drlivers has been used to develop a set of
"scenarios," that ou!,line "reasonable alternative descriptions of
changes in the work load that could take place over time. These
scenarios are also expressed in quantitative terms, and estimates have
been made of the magnitude and likelihood of the effects of each of
them.
The other parallel study, discussed in Section V, was organized to
investigate the operations of the Identification Division as a
government agency subject to policies, regulatiot.4, controls and
judicial decisions initiating in various other federal sind state
government agenciesp and resulting in structural change as well as
change in work load. The model developed for that study is termed
the "external model."
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A principal focus in both of the studies reported here has been
the nature and probability of changes in the future work 'load of the
Identification Division arising in the external environment. As in
any study that attempts to derive usable information about the future,
it is necessary to make a careful distinction here between the process,
of projacqnA existing patterns under the assumption that the forces
And interacti ons between and among the determinants will remain more
or lees the same, and the act of prediction t which is essentially the
expression of personal opinion. There is no hard-and s-vast rule about
the subject matter for projections: projections of future populations
and economic conditions are perhaps the most familiar examples, but
the determination of present and future patterns in funding and
legislative actions by Congress is an equally legitimate projection.
Unfortunately, the word "prediction" has a variety of uses in everyday
speech that make it difficult to preserve the necessary distinction.
This distinction is particularly important for the discussions
of the impacts of external drivers on the Identification Division work
load, since these drivers include not only long-run social, econFmic,
demographic, and political trends but particular events which might
seem to fall into the prohibited class of predictions, In this case,
the event - the passa$e of particular legislation by Congress, for
example, or the declaration of wax cannot be predictable in the
sense of having a probability very close to one of occurance at a
specific date. It may however be rp ojected as likely or unlikely to
occur during a given period of years, using as a basis the observed
patterns of behavior in Congress and elsewhere and analysis of those
patterns.
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C.	 THE INTERNAL MODEL.: DESCRIPTION OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL
The diagram of the internal model in Figure 1-5 suggests two
possible locations of changes in the work load of the Identification
Division: (1) the policies of acceptance and rejection of inquiries,
submissions and information from users originating in the Division
itself, and (2) the pressures And forces acting on the needs of the
users initiating in their environment. In this model, the usersear
se are assumed to have little if any control on the volume and
d stribution of their use of the services of the Division, whether for
record keeping or for identification, but are assumed to be governed
themselves ^^ existing or projected statutes, regulations, judicial
decisions and the like.*
As is apparent from this outline, the users of the Division's
services are thus treated as essentially transparent to the social
environment of individuals, agencies and institutions in which they
operate. This environment is largely identical with the social
*This heroic assumption is abandoned in the subsequent discussion of
the external model.
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environment of the United States, In which not only such quantifiable
variobles as population, employment, income, age distribution and the
like undergo changes over time, but changes also occur in attitudes,
values, behaviors and behavioral norms expressed in social and
political institutions.
The methodology for investigating the properties of such a model.
is necessarily historical, but it does not consist entirely of
displaying the paths over time of the relevant variables, although
such displays and the direct conclusions that can be drawn from them
are an appropriate component of the analysis. But these time paths
must be intarrpreted, their origins sought and their consequences
spelled out.
Clearly, what is being described here is the general methodology
of 411 the :social sciences in their current configuration a$
disciplines within the academic communities of scholarship and
research. This studyg however, is not such a work of social science;
and although the papers and books consulted to provide backgrtund and
insight have such origins, the approach taken here omits the
discussion of deep issues of social, political and economic causality
in favor of a more pragmatic technique that assumes the transmission
of the effect$ of social trends and pressures directly through the
users of the Identification Division to the volume and distribution of
the Division's work load.
D.	 ANALYSIS OF THE WORK LOAD
1.	 Types of Services provided by the Identification Division
Analysis of information supplied by the Identification Division
indicates that the total amount of services supplied to users has
remained relatively constant over the past ten years, although the
distribution of tasks in the work load has varied to some extent.
This constancy is judged to reflect in part conscious policy in the
Division and in part reflects the stabilizing of certain national
trends.
Before further discussion of the analysis, it will be worthwhile
to make some distinctions between the types of services provided by
the Division and the distribution of the work load. The fundamental
distinction between fingerprint search and record-keeping activities
is rather less clear in practice than might be exp . ted. Every
fingerprint search does in fact entail record keeping of one kind or
another, but the con.-verse is not the case. A considerable amount of
record keeping and record searching has very little if any connection.
to fingerprints per se. Moreover, record keeping associated with
fingerprint search differs according to the type of submission
initiating the search. Thus, fingerprints of applicants for jobs and
licenses in states where laws require fingerprint identification for
these purposes are searched in criminal fingerprint files for matches
(unless a match has been obtained on the basis of name, birth date,
2-3
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physical characteristics, etc.}. In either case, the match is
verified by comparison of the subject's fingerprints to the criminal
fingerprints on file. Those state applicant fingerprint cards that
era not found are not retained in the Identification Divi g i,on;, and no
record of them is  kept. Fingerprints of those convicted of crimes are
retained along with other inform*tion about such individuals ("rap
sheas"), and subse went inquiries about them may be answered without
fingerprint search Ithe verification trl comparison of fingerprints is
still performed).
2.	 Classification of the Work "Goad
For the purposes of this analysis and somewhat arbitrarily, the
work load of the Division has been estimated on the basis of a
four-way classification scheme in Table 2-1 and Figures 2-1 and 2-2
that divide the fingerprint submissions into "criminal" and
"applicant" and the users into "federal" and "state." As noted above,
fingerprint submissions do not constitute the, total work load however,
and a second classification scheme based on the distinction between
"fingerprint submissions" and "correspondence name checks" is used for
"Table 2-2. In that table, the numbers and proportions of inquiries of
the two kinds are shown for the ten years, 1970 to 1979. There is no
direct connection between the two classifications that would permit
the assignment of the total inquiries to federal and state, users.
However, since all the entries under the classification
11correspondenca name creaks" are necessarily concerned with criminal
history record keeping or the dissemination of criminal history
records, it is relatively safe to assume that the distribution of such
inquiries between federal and state users is similar to the
distribution between the users of criminal fingerprint submissions, as
shown in Table 2-1.
Figure 2-3 shown that throughout the ten years shown, criminal
submissions have mostly been in the majority. The sharp drop in
criminal submissions between 1973 and 1974 followed the action by the
Identification Division in reclassifying the offenses for which
fingerprints were submitted, the similar decrease in applicant
submissions between 1971 and 1972 was the result of a policy by the
FBI* that applicant submissions could be accepted only for employment
and licensing covered by state laws requiring such submissions.
Subsequently many of these statutes were enacted.
An analysis of the historical records of the identification
Division indicates that the pattern of use for each activity has
remained relatively constant over the past ten years. This pattern is
revealed in Figures 2-3 and 2-4. There appears to be no ready
explanation for the increase in government applications. The Office
of personnel Management, and the Department of Defense have indicated
*The FBI policy was implemented to carry out the direction and policy
of the Department of Justice and the congress.
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rTable 2-1. Percentage of Total Identification Division
Activity by Sources (FX 1979)
,Ac t ivity
Criminal Applicant
Source	 Check Check	 ;,	 Total
Federal	 5% 42X	 47%
(307,000) (20581,000)
(2p335,000) (9229000)
State	 38% 15%
	
53%
Total
	
43% 57%	 100%
In order to relate sources of activity to function (ie.,
identification and criminal history record keeping). certain estimates_
must be made.) as Identification Division records do not collect data
which enables direct calculation. 	 To make these estimates, the
following information taken from the records of the Identification
Division was used:
(1)	 95% of all names checked in connection with applicant and
licensing checks require a full fingerprint search.
(2)	 5% of all applicant checks involve a record on file in the
Identification Division.
(3) 73% of all criminal checks .result in a match (i.e., a
person is determined to have a record at the
Identification Division) with only a name &-,,eck or check
of an FBI number.
(4) 27% of all criminal checks do not produce a match on a
name check and require a full fingerprint search.
This information is diagrammed
	 Figure- 2-1.
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Figure 2-1. Total Identification Division Work Load
Activity by Source
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that their hiring and induction rates have been constant and are expected
to remain so. This trend toward increase in government-generated
applications is discussed in Section Y.
Yet another breakdown of the w;?rk load of fingerprints for search is
shown in Table 2-3. In this table: the fingerprints remaining after the
removal of cards judged to be illegible are shown under the appropriate
classifications. The fingerprints of aliens that comprised 5.5% of the
1970 total in Table 2-2 a're shown in this table to have declined between
1970 and 1979 to a negligibly small number, corresponding to a change in
policy with respect to the processing of fingerprints from aliens.*
E.	 CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion suggests:
(1) There is no strong bias toward federal''or state use of the
system.
(2) Federal submissions result in-many more fingerprint checks
than record changes because of the large difference between
applicant and criminal submissions.
(3) State submissions produce many more record checks than
fingerprint identifications because of the large difference
between applicant and criminal submissions.
(4) Non-criminal justice use of the Identification Division by
federal agencies is a large percentage of the total work load
and a large percentage of total fingerprint checks.
(5) 'Non-criminal justice use of criminal justice information by
states is small in relation to their total use.
(6) A great majority of employment and licensing checks require a
full fingerprint search.
1.	 Classification of Criminal versus Non-criminal Submissions
An important difference between the criminal and non-criminal
components of the work load lies in the character of the determinants of
the volume of submissions in the two categories. The submissions
classified as "criminal" are entirely determined by the actions of local,
*This change called for the collection and stoage of alien finger-
prints without the accompanying search through criminal files.
During the mass influx of Cuban nationals in the spring of 1980, the
Division.undertook fingerprint. search of those arriving inFlorida at the
request of the Immigration. and Naturalization Service which financed the
additional labor required.
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state and federal law enforcement agencies in the process of
investigating crime and apprehending criminals. The volume of such
submissions then depends directly on both the numbers of crimes* and
the level of Activity in the law enforcement agencies. Neither, kind
of activity has any direct effect on non-criminal submissions, except
for the presence among these of a relatively small number of lay.
enforcement employees.
2. Federal and State Components
As demonstrated in Figures 2-3 and 2-4 1 the fingerprint
identification services of the Division are supplied in roughly equal
amounts to federal agencies on the one hand and state and local
agencies on the other. Howeverp the distinction between criminal and
non-criminal submissions are markedly different in the two cases, with
federal criminal submissions comprising only 3% of the total, compared
to state and local criminal submissions at 40% of the total.
Furthermorey in addition to the approximately b million fingerprint
submissions processed annually in the Division, an additional
4 million pieces of correspondence received are concerned either with
updates of criminal histories on file in the Division from state and
local. agencies or with state and local queries on those histories.
3. Record-Keeping Services
The figures quoted above indicate how large a component of the
work Load consists of record keeping. as distinguished from
fingerprint identification eP r se. Not only do the 4 million annual
correspondence/name checks require record-keeping activities, but so
also do the additional 6 million fingerprint submissions. The
estimated proportion of criminal identifications completed without
fingerprint search is 60y, and an additional 5% of applicant
identifications are completed, by a search of record's without
fingerprint search (but with identification verification based on
fingerprint comparison).
*Various technical distincti6ns between crimes included in an
individual's criminal h istocy and those not included are reflected in
the tabulations of the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI, published	 r.
annually a,s Crime in the United States. These are not relevant to	 i
the discussion here.
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SECTION III
DRIVERS
A.	 IDENTIFICATION OF THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN THE WORM LOAD OF THE
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
As previously discussed t a driver of work load change is s
potential trend, event, or legislative action that can produce u
change in the amount or type of fingerprint submissions to the
Identification Division, or ` a change in the way the work is
disseminated from the Division, e.g., potential, trends that increase
or limit access to the system.
In the subsequent discussion of the impact of different drivers
on the work load of the Division (Table 3-0, the list of drivers is
rather arbitrarily divided into a set of different classes. These are:
(1)	 Projections of historical trends.
(a) Economic trends.
(b) Demographic trends.
(c) Trends in political concerns (embodied in
leginlative/judicial actions).
(d) Technological; trends.
(2)	 Anticipated/possi;ble events.
(a) Legislative/judicial actions.
(b) Domestic and international events.
As explained in Section I, a well-defined methodology permits
projections of the kinds listed under Category (1). For these
projections historical data exist and can be correlated with trends in
the work load of the Division for the same period. The projected
increases and decreasc;.* in the work load can thus be offered with some
security as to their accuracy and reliability.
By contrast, the actions and events that appear in Category (Z)
cannot be treated by the technique of projection. instead, historical
data have been used to acquire estimates of possible upper and lower
bounds, and the probabilities (where they are discussed) are based on
a reasonable consensus of subjective opinion quite different from the
statistical calculations used for trends in the first category,,
Tne selection of the actual drivers used here was based on a set
of criteria derived in the course of the study. In the list of these
criteria that follows, it is apparent that a mixture of theoretical
and practical grounds were used,
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I	 Criteria for the Selection of Drivers of Change in the Work Load
,, The criteria identified for the selection of drivers'^'f change
in the work load are:
(1) An observable historical trend that has a (statistically)
verifiable connection to components of the work load,
(2) An observable trend that has a deducible connection to
components of the work load but may lack directly
quantifiable components and on which there is consensus
about its projection.
(3) An action or event that has not yet occurred and cannot be
projected from observed trends but has been the subject of
wide public concern and is related to components of the
work load.
(4) An action or event hat has not occurred and cannot be
projected from observed trends but is a subject of concern
to staff members of the Identification Division in its
implications for the work load.
B.	 DISCUSSION OF THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN THE WORK LOAD
1.	 Economic Trends
For the past several years, the national economy hozs displayed
two overriding characteristics: a steadily increasing rate of
inflation and a slowing in the rate of economic growth in real
terms.* Relatively high rates of unemployment have also appeared,
along with marked shifts in the industrial structure.
The result of the ind^o'trial shift has been to decrease
availability of entry-level jobs in Blue Collar industries
(manuftctur.ng, construction) and thus decrease the rates of
employment among young entrants to the labor force.
These trends have effects on the work load through different
mechanisms. Crime rates, which are closely connected to rates of,
criminal submissions, are largely determined by property crimes, which
make yap about 90% of the total crimes in the United States. Property
crime in turn is directly related to.bo'th the quantity of property in
the society (money and objects) and the value of the property.
Although the slowing of real growth will reduce the growth of real
property, inflation will increase the money value of what, exists.
*The Gross National Product (GNP) has increased steadily in terms of
(current) dollars, but the increase is much reduced when account is
taken of inflation and the amount is expressed in so-called "real"
dollars.
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Moreover, the distribution of wealth, including real property, is
concentrated. A relatively small fraction of individuals holds a
disproportionately large fraction of total wealth. Thus t incentives
remain for property crime even in the„presence of a slower growth of
wealth. Furthermore, the large numbers of young people without
employment or employed at very low wages increase the likelihood that
rates of property crime and thus criminal submissions will continue to
grow at their present rates. Criminal submission statistics over a
ten year period are shown in Figure 3-1.
The projection of a stagnant economy for the forseeable future
will also influence projections of non -criminal submissions to the
Identification Division. The slower rate of growth in the economy as
a whole and the static (and occasionally increasing) unemployment rate
will inevitably reduce the number of new jobs in both the private and
public sectors and thus the rate of growth in the number of applicant
submissions. In the private sector, banking employment has been the
major source of applicant submissions. As shown in Figure 3-2,
Applicant Submission Statistics, the earlier rapid expansion of
employment in banking has slowed as the establishvient of new banks and
new bank branches has approached saturation even in the new auburban
and exurban population centers. (Government sector employment is
treated in detailed discussions below.) Observable economic and
political trends effectively rule out any large increases in federal
civilian employment in the near future and suggest that the present
level is likely to be maintained, with the exception of
defense-rela
i
l,'ed employment discussed below.
The result of the effects outlined above is jud$ed to project a
continuation in the present overall rate of growth in the work load as
an upper bound to possible increases. No lower bound has been
estimated. The effect on the distribution of the work load between
criminal and non-criminal submissions is likely to still further
increase the proportion of activities concerned with criminal
identification and criminal history record keeping,, but since a
smaller fraction of criminal identification requires actual
fingerprint search than does non-criminal identification, a decrease
in the number of fingerprint searches may be observed.
2.	 Other Economic Trends
a.	 Constraints on Federal Expenditures. Federal expenditures
for "defense” have provided the major channel for government stimulus
to the private sector. These expenditures are a present focus of
national interest, and one in which economic concerns are to some
extent in conflict with political concerns. Although a relatively
large fraction (62X) of all employment security checks that make use
of the services of the Division have come from the Department of
Defense and its contractors in recent years, the present uncertainties
about defense expenditures prevent any confident judgments about
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future impacts. Only a lower bound, corresponding to the minimum of
such submissions over the recent past, could be confidently assigned
if that figure were available.*
, b.	 Constraints on Federal Employment. Job freezes of one
kind or another in federal employment have appeared from time to time,
and after a period of extremely rapid growth in the 1960's in which
the number of federal/civilian employees increased by 25%, the rate of
increase has slowed and the total number has now been relatively
stable at about 2.9 million since 1970.
C.	 Reduction in Federal Support of LEAA. Cutbacks in the
funding of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) now in
process can be read as evidence of the demise of this federal agency.
Its appropriations have been used to improve the overall quality and
capabilities of state and local law enforcement agencies, and in some
states the funds from LEAH grants supplied incentives for state
investment in large-scale automated identification services at thej,	
state level. One result of such programs has been the acquired
ability of some states to carry out parts of the record -keeping and
identification services that would otherwise have been supplied by the
Identification Division. This support by LEAH to the states thus
reduced the work load of the Division.
.;
	
	 The effect of the withdrawal of federal funds for such state
systems is not likely to have large immediate impact on the present
patterns of the work load for several reasons. The LEAA grants have
already been used to make the necessary investments in states that
have developed automated identification systems of their own; and
although the use and maintenance of those systems will require
continued state expenditures, they will not require the large-scale
expenditures associated with the installation and start -up operations
of a newly automated system. It is thus concluded that the states
where well-developed identification systems for law enforcement are in
place will continue to make use of these systems at the same level and
will not increase their submissions.
Those states that have not developed information and
identification systems capable of filtering out submissions that would
otherwise have gone to the Identification Division are much less
likely to do so in the absence of federal funds for that purpose.
However, some of these states already use the services of the Division
to the maximum extent possible: as a replacement for all in-state
identification services. Their submissions thus cannot increase,
although plans they may have begun with the expectation of LEAA
funding will obviously be postponed, if not abandoned.
a
*Statistics on the sources and distribution of the work load that have 	 js
been made available for this study do not include tl ,e necessary
breakdowns.
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The major impact on the work load may be expected to come from
states in which fully-developed information and identification systems
have been in process but are not yet fully operational to the degree
achieved in other staters. In the 1979,study for the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment, assessment was made of in-state
capability and use of criminal history information and centralized
criminal information services. Of the 43 states included, 14 were
found to be "high-grade users," and 13 to be "low-grade users." Of
the remaining 16, six were noted to be "currently considering
implementing upgrades" of their in-state systems. This last class of
states are likely to be the ones in which the cutbacks of LEAA funds
will result in increase's in the work load of the Division, under the
assumption that their growing needs for services were the basis for
the planned upgrading of their own systems, plans that may now be
unusable without the LEAH funds. No secure estimate of this possible
increase can be made.
d.	 Limits on the Budget of the Identification Division. Two
responses are available to the Division itself if it becomes necessary
to reduce its work load in the case where budgeting for its operations
is insufficient to maintain the existing volume of services.
Introduction cf Fees for Services. Since under existing policy
services of the Division are generally provided without charge to
users, the imposition of fees ;is a possibility for certain classes of
users with needs that mightbe judged less relevant to the public
good, thus supplying less justification for the use of public funds.
Examples of such users are relatively scarcer and in any case
constitute a very small fraction of the current work load. Perhaps
the single case in which fees might be judged appropriate is the set
of applicant submissions for the licensing of certain occupations that
are required in very few states. Examples of such occupations are
those of cosmetologist, barber, dry cleaner, and holder, of "massage
parlor permit" (required in California), driving school staff member
(required in Georgia), and real patate salesperson (required in a few
states).' Unfortunately no direct measure of the volume of such
applicant submissions is available in existing data collections, but
it is clearly small if not negligible.
If, on the other hand, a policy of fees for all services
supplied for applicant submissions should be instituted, the upper
bound for the reduction in volume could approach the present volume of
such submissions, which lies close to one million submissions
annually. This high a volume is however +extremely unlikely, and total
effects on work load are judged to be necessarily very small.
Introduction of New Criteria for Submissions. As noted in
Section II in the discussion of the types of services provided by the
Division, two changes in the criteria for submissions to the
Identification Division were introduced in the 1970's. One change was
the redefinition of "crimes" for which fingerprints submissions of
those arrested and charged had been required. The other was a
regulation requiring that only those non-federal applicant submissions
for which state laws required fingerprint identification .could be
submitted. The immediate effects were a reduction of almost one-half
million criminal fingerprint submissions from 1973 to 1974 and a
reduction of one-half million applicant submissions from 1971 to
1972. However, by 1978 enough states had passed the required laws
that the number of non-federal applicants was close to the original
1971 figure of more than 800,000. Criminal submissions have, however,
remained close to the reduced figure of 1974, 2.8 million, probably
because the number of crimes increased between 1974 and 1979 at a
somewhat slower rate than earlier.
Using the reductions in the volume of submissions that followed
the earlier changes in criteria yields an upper bound estimate of
close to one million. However, the achievement of a reduction of such
a magnitude is relatively un^ kely, and a more reasonable estimate of
the reduction that could be achieved through a change in criteria for
submission of fingerprints would lie closer to 250,000, restricted to
non-federal applicant submissions on principles very much like those
discussed for the imposition of fees for identification services.
e.	 Constraints on State Expenditures. The much discussed
taxpayer revolt at the state and local level began with the 1978
passage of proposition 13 in California, which set limits on the real
estate taxes that could be imposed by Local authorities. The observed
result there has bee, ► a tightening of the state budget, as
discretionary funds formerly available from state sources had to be
diverted to local authorities to close the fiscal gap. A subsequent
proposal to limit the income-taxing authority at the state level was
defeated. Without the strong leadership of `the anti-tax program that
appeared in California no comparable changes in state and local taxing
policies have actually been enacted elsewhere, but support for such
programs of tax reduction has received much attention in other states.
Even without a cutback in tax revenues, the budgets of states
and local municipalities are not judged to be increasing at the same
rate as inflation, and fiscal crisis has been .a continuing problem in
many regions over the recent past. Two possible effects of tighter
state and local budgets on the work load of the Identification
Division are listed below.
Constraints on State and Local Government Employment. The
number of workers employed by state and local governments increased by
60% between 1960 and 1970, but has remained relatively constant at
about 12.8 million over the past several years. Constraints on state
and local budgets are likely to prevent further increases at the
national level, although possible shifts of population away from the
older states of the North and the Northeast and into the Sunbelt may
cause a redistribution of state and Local government employment, which
is closely linked to population. As a result, even with static or
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declining total national employment in state andlocal Sovernment, new
employees may be taken on in some areas while employees in other areas
are reduced. There is no evidence for an appreciable increase or
decrease in applicant submissions for these employees> since all
related observed trends are minimal.
1)	 Reduction in the Budgets of State Identification Systems. As
discussed above the maintenance and operation of state criminal
information systems that are comprehensive and automated to a degree
that permits state users to receive needed information in s-state and
without submissions to the Identification Division may pose some
fiscal problems in the absence of LEAA Funds. Constraints on state
budgets are likely to have similar results. One severe problem for
the state and local agencies concerned is the absence of reliable
information and analysis that would indicate the value of such
information and its accessibility. Without reliable ;estimates of such
values, decisions on expenditures for state systems are likely to be
postponed and it is doubtful they will receive vigorous positive
action.
Cutbacks in state funds for such services are sure to result in
an increase in the processing of criminal submissions and criminal
history record keeping in the Division. The effects on applicant
submissions are likely to be much smaller, but neither kind of
increase can be estimated securely because of the diversity of
capability and policy among the different states.
C	 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
1.	 Slower Growth of U.S. Population
Rapid increases in population characterized the period from 1950
to IM, but the rate of growth has slowed appreciably since then. A
principal cause of the slowdown has been the declining birth rates of
the recent past, and these in turn have been attributed to a
widespread change in the social and economic patterns affecting family
formation, the presence of women in the labor force, the availability
of birth control technologies including legalized abortion and others.
Inevitably, a slower growth in population results in a slower
growth in the use of services to identify individuals, and thus to a
slower roe of increase in the work load of the Identification
Division. The actual magnitude of the effects is difficult to
estimate directly. No actual decrease in the work load can be
expected as long as the population is slowly increasing or
stationary. However, the rate of increase in the work load can be
expected to reflect more or less directly the slowing increase in
population, which now amounts to an increase of less than one percent
per annum. Of much greater importance for estimating the impact on
the work load are the components of existing and future population
trends.
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2. Increasing Median Age
Median age in the United States reached a low at the end of the
1960 1 9 9 reflecting the cumulative effects of the post-war baby boon,.
It has increased since then, and is not expected to decrease again in';:`,
the forseeable future. The implications of this trend toward an olden
population are most critical for criminal submissions, since the
highest rates of arrest by age group are concentrated among younger
people. For Crimes 1 r.4ex offenses,* 41% of those arrested in 1978 were
under the age of 18, 58% of those arrested were under 21 and 72% of
those under 25. The population aged 14 to 24, which has been an
increasing proportion of total population over the past 20 years, will
become a declining proportion in the future, with the result of a
lowered crime rate and thus reduced annual volume of criminal
submissions.
The present (1978) proportion of people aged 14 to 24 is 20.8%
of the population, and that is projected to decline to about 17% in
1985 and to less than 15% in 1990. Assuming that the decrease in the
numbers of young people in the population may be directly reflected by
a decrease in the crimes committed by young people (rather than by a
redistribution Among people of different age groups of the same volume
of crimes), the 5% decline in the 14- to-24-year-old population between
1980 and 1990 would produce a 4% decrease in total crimes committed in
that period, which amounts to less than 0.4% per annum. The total
effects of increasing median age on both criminal and applicant
submissions and record keeping is thus likely to lie well below 1% per
annum.
A similar effect for applicant submissions can be dedueed for a
population with declining proportions of entrants to the labor force.
Neither effect: on criminal or on applicant submissions can be
estimated directly, but both are likely to produce a small overall
reduction in the work load.
3. Changes in Mobility
Different kinds of movements of population have different
consequences for the work load of the Identification Division.
Movement out of the older urban centers of the North and the
Northeast to suburban and exurban residential communities in the same
area has been a continuing trend since the 1950'x. Recent data that
would confirm the effectiveness of new programs designed to attract
and -retain middle-income families in the cities are difficult to
*Crime Index offenses are those statistically recorded in Crime in the
United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, annual publication.
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interpret securely, but data from the late 1970's 4o not appear to
indicate a reduction in urban crime grates and do show a greater
proportional crime increase in areas outaido the older larger cities.
No projection of these effects has been attempteA.
Increased movement to the states of the Sunbelt, including not
only the southeast and south central regions but the whole of'the
Pacific Coast has been observed through met of the 1970's. Predicted
increases in the costs of energy For residents in colder regions that
are lacking in oil and gas resources are likely to have increased this
trend, but data will not be available until the results of the 1980
Census are published.
The effects of interregional mobility on the work load of the
Division are directly dependent on the particular states involved. As
discussed elsewherep the variability state-to-wtate of submissions to
the Division implies that analysis would have to be carried out state
by state to determine whether the total effect of this kind of
population mobility will increase or decrease the work load.
D.	 LEGISLATIVE OUDICIAL TRENDS
1.	 Trends in Political Concerns Embodied in Legislative Actions or
Judicial Decisions
a. Privacy of Information about Persons. Widespread concern
about the use of information on individuals for non•-criminal
intelligence operations led to the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974
and to suits brought in federal courts by individuals to prevent the
maintenance and dissemination of their records in criminal history
files. (See Appendix A, Menard v. Saxbe, Tarleton v. Saxbe.) The
results have been a change in regulations governing the retention of
fingerprints in the criminal files of the Identification Division And
the dissemination of information on undisposed criminal charges
against individuals. The principal impact of these changes has been
an increase in the record-keeping activities of the Division of
unknown magnitude.
Continuing public concern about the issues of the privacy of
information held by government agencies about individuals is not
judged likely to lead to new regulations but to manifest itself in
greater and more thorough monitoring of existing practices to insure
that violations of existing laws and regulations are not committed.
Little impact can be expected on the work load from this trend, but
internal processing procedures may become more complicated.
b. Freedom of Information. The Freedom of Information Act 	 i
requires that all government agencies must supply copies of their
records to any individual who requests such information. Clearly,
conflicts exist .between this act and the laws and regulations
	 i
governing privacy, as discussed above. In particular, regulations
following the passage of the Freedom of Information Act have allowed i
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the Department of Justice to exempt the whop system of criminal
histories and identification records from public disclosure.
-Since 1976 $ the Department of Justice has permitted any
individual to review the criminal information maintained about him and
to initiate corrections of that information. The number of requests
from individuals for this and other purposes was 4 $ 330 in 1978 (the
first year for which a count is available), increasing to 7 $ 619 in
1979. An upper bound of 15 $ Q00 such requests per annum has been
projected,
%:,	 Speedy Arraignment. The constitutional guarantee of
speedy trial has been interpreted in judicial decisions to apply to
the presentment of charges after arrests so that individuals may not
bra held for long periods without court hearings that lead to
arraignment. The present relatively long period of time between a
request for information in criminal history files of the Division and
the receipt of that information by mail makes such requests by state
and local agencies of the criminal justice system unlikely to be
satisfied in the required time, Thus, it is likely there will be no
change in the volume of such requestsr since the identification system
in the Division is currently not used in the arraignment process. The
impact of the electronic communications to and from the Division on
the arraignment processes was not analyzed because electronic
communication outside the Division was not part of the AIDS III
evaluation.
d,	 Decriminalization of "Victimless Crimes.' Since not every
present violation of state and local laws on such victimless offenses
as gambling, prostitution $ drunkenness $ vagrancy $ disorderly conduct
and the use and posession of certain drugs now requires the submission
of fingerprints and criminal history records to the identification
Division $ the possible decriminalization of some of these offenses can
have little effect on the work loud. An exception-is the legalization
of casino gambling $ discussed below.
Legalization of Casino Gambling. The legalization of casino
gambling has become a recent prospect in those states in the Northeast
(New York, New Hampshire $ Delaware $ District of Columbia) in which the
combination of the decline in formerly active tourist resorts and the
need for new sources of state revenue meke the example of Nevada`'
somewhat attvactive. New Jersey is the only state othe.k' than Nevada
to have enacted the necessary legislation, and in New Jersey legalized
casino gambling is restricted to the single community of Atlantic
City. Comparison of the criminal and applicant submissions of Nevada
and New Jersey over the relevant period (1978 $ 1979) do not lead to
any clear conclusions. Nevada has had the highest rates per capita of
both criminal and applicant submissions during the 1970's, but New
Jersey submissions in those categories have not shown an identifiable
trend that could be associated  with gambling.
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On common-sense grounds, it is reasonable that states where
gambling is legalized would also require certain employees to undergo
applicant identification procedures, and that this would increase the
applicant submissions to the work load, Whether or not the observable
higher cr$,me rates in Nevada that correspond to high rates per capita,
for crimin;al submissions would necessarily ,accompany the legalization
of casino gambling cannot be decided on the basis of available
information.
2.	 Legislative Actions and Judicial Decisions That May Occur
a. Increase in the Immigration Quota. An increase in the
U.S. immigration quota of from 200,000 immigrants to 750,000 has been
discussed, increasing the present quota by more than one-half million
per year. This increase would be directly transmitted in the form of
fingorprint identification requests to the work load of the Division,
"Foreign students" now constitute a special category of
non-immigrant entrants to the United States whose fingerprints are
also submitted, as are those of all resident aliens. Facing declining
enrollments in the 1980 1 s, U.S. colleges may step up their current
efforts to recruit students overseas. Such efforts have recently
resulted in an increase of foreign students of more than 50% over the
time period 1975 to 1978 ) when foreign student enrollment reached a
fgure of close to 25G,000 An estimate of 50U,o00 per year for
foreign students would not be unreasonable, but a large fraction of
these, as many as one half, may be accounted for as immigrants under
the increased immigration quota.
The estimate of the upper bound of the total increase possible
from increased immigration and increased residence in the United
States of foreign students is judged to be 800,000 submissions per
yearly
b. Increase in "Foreign Workers." At present only U.S.
immigrants are legally permitted to hold paid employment, but some
pressures on the part of employers in agriculture and in industries
requiring large number of unskilled or semi-skilled workers may result
in the restoration of the "bracero" program that brought approximately
65,000 foreign workers to the United States from 1949 to 1964.
c. Inclusion of Women in Po ssible Military Draft. A suit now
pending in the federal court system will result in a decision on the
inclusion of women in the current program of draft registration. If
that decision does require the registration of women,, they would
presumably be included in the event of a draft of civilians For
military service. However, no such draft is currently in force, and
its occurrence cannot be projected securely. Moreover, the drafting
of women would not increase the total number of draftees whose
fingerprints would be submitted but only redistribute the number among
women and men. No effect on submissions would occur.
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d. National Gun Registration, Congressional bills to require
the licansing—a—If individual owners of certain kinds of ,firearms
have been proposed over the years, and some are currently pending.
Evidence on the likelihood of such legislation is not clear-cut.
Various polls of public opinion over the years have shown some
indication that a majority of U.S. citizens support such legislation.
It is estimated that there are firearms in the possession of 55% of
American households.
If a law ward passed requiring the submission of fingerprints to
the Identification Division, the immediate impact of the estimated 100
million submissions on the Division would be to swamp all other
current identification and record-keeping outivttio s. Clearly, a
structural change in the organization of the entire national
identification system would be required and might bead to the setting
up of separate agencies that are different in character from the
present structure of the Division.
e. Institution of a National Identification S stam. The
possibility of ai national i.d;ntifIcation system similar to those now
in use in the countries of western Europe and Canada would likely
require fingerprint identifications. As discussed above, the
processing of approximately 220 million fingerprints could not be
undertaken in the present organizational structure of the
Identification Division and would likel y require the establishment of
a separate system.
	 -	 -
f. Adoption of the Interstate Ident-ification Index (III).
Under the prov'isiona of the FBI bEAA-proposed Interstate
'Identification 'Index, the requests from user agencies for criminal
history information would no longer be answered by the transmittal of
criminal history rectords, but would instead be answered by information
about the state and local agencies where such information could be
obtained. The proposed index has been discussed with reference to a
location in the NCIC/CCR, located in the FBI but separate from the
Identification Division. Inclusion of discussion of the Index here is
based on the rationale that records in the Division coilld be similarly
treated and answers to criminal submissions given in the form of
"pointers" to state and local records.
A survey of personnel in existing state criminal information
systems showed their "overwhelming perference" for such an indexing
system, but also indicated the perception of the need for a national
center for the indexing function. 'Twenty-three of the forty states
represented in the survey favor the FBI as that agency, although seven
of these would prefer a system in which policy control of the indexing
agency would be held by the (state) participants.
If the proposed Index or some alternative to it were implemented
it would be likely to involve only the more populated urban states
that have already undertaken the centralization of criminal record
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kooping with some degree of automation. An overall reduction of 5% to
10% in the present level of criminal submissions to the work Toad is
estimated as the result if full implementation of III were to occur
This reduction applies to the identification Division as well as the
NCTC/CCH.
E. EVENTS THAT COULD AFFECT THE WORK LOAD OF THE IDENTIFICATION
DIVISION
1.	 Outbreak of War
The declaration of war by the United States and the necessary
mobilization of greatly expanded armed forces and the institution of
wartime security measures would increase the work load of the Division
by an amount judged to be at least equal to the total impact of World
War Il, which was approximately 5 million additional fingerprints per
Year processed over the relevant years. A partial mobilization] i.e.,
a peace-time draft or a localized war such as the Korean or Vietnam
war, is estimated to be accompanied by an approximate work load
increase of 300,000 fingerprints from the Armed forces. The
likelihood of these events has not been estimated.
21	 Civil. Disorder, Terrorism
investigations by the Congressional. Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respi:,J to Intelligence Activities in
1976 revealed the extent of programs under FBI direction that
maintained surveillance of citizens and files of information on them.
Subsequent policies have presumably reduced such activities from their
earlier high levels in the 1960's and early 1970'x. Their
re-institution could come however as a response to outbreaks of civil
disorder and terrorism. Resumption of such activities is judged to be
unlikely for the near future.
F. TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS
1. Electronic Mail
Electric mail is a technological innovation which is virtually
certain to expand greatly during the next decade. Eventually, all
large institutions can be expected to rely on electronic mail,
including the criminal justice system. Since use of conventional mail
now constitutes one of the major limits on the system's response time,
the shift to electronic mail can be expected to increase the speed of
the system greatly, and this in turn may lead to increased use by the
states.
2. Technologies of Identi.ficat en
The use of techniques = wased on the biological and medical
sciences, hematology, histology and others, has already become a
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part of the arsenal of identification procedures at the local level.
New developments in these technologies give some promise of providing
techniques of identification as secure as the present use of
fingerprints that are possibly cheaper and easier to use. "Voice
prints" is anoth,er'+example of a developing identification technology
with some advantages over fingerprint identification.
None of these possible developments is likely to have much
effect on the volume of applicant or criminal submissions for the near
future, during the next 10 to 15 years. Theit development could,
however, be facilitated or impeded by trends that increase or decrease
the volume of submissions for fingerprint identification and by trends
that raise or lower the costs of that method of identif-.cation.
3. Technologies of Storage, Processing and Retrieval of
Information
A variety of technologies now available and in process can
affect the existing system of fingerprint identification: automation,
telecommunications and augmented computer memories at much reduced
costs among others. These developments make feasible a national
employment identification system, the merging of criminal and civil
files, immediate access to central files from distant locations
without human intervention and others.
It should be noted that at present, the FBI civil and criminal
files are kept in different buildings. The criminal file contains 77
million fingerprint cards and 14.5 criminal history records
representing 22 million persons and is searched in response to the 5.8
million inquiries per 'N'Tear. The c.ivi,l file is rarely searched,
usually only to identify unknown dead, and contains 93 million
fingerprint cards representing 42 million persons.i
1
Merging the civil and criminal files would be an enormous task.
However, merging would enable the efficient searching of both files.
4. Other Trends
a.	 Natural Disasters. Although the occurrence of large
numbers of deaths of unidentified people associated with such natural
disasters as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions
are not predictable, the overall increase in population of recent
years has led to greater populations in areas that are prone to such
disasters. For example, a large proportion of the increased
population of California is located in the coastal zone between San
Francisco and Los Angeles, vulnerable to earthquakes associated with
California faults. Similarly, population increases in Florida subject
larger numlNers of people to the threatb of hurricanes originating in
the Caribbean. Improved future technologies for monitoring and
warning systems may greatly reduce the likelihood of sudden surges to
3-20
athe work load for the identification of unknown dead. However t the
occurance of any such events and the,-sagnitude of their subsequent
effects upon the work load cannot be predicted.
b.	 The 1984 Olympic Games. Though some uncertainty exists
about the future: of the Olympic Games, the 1984 games still are
planned for Los Angeles. The trend has been toward ever-increasing
security requirements, and therefore a prudent expectation is that the
Olympics will impose additional burden or. the system.
The increase in work load should be at least as great as the
increase during the 1980 Winter Games, i.e., 25,000 name checks.
i
I
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SECTION IV
SCENARIOS
A.	 STEADY STATE AND,TRENDS
The following scenarios *aero developed from the data obtained.
These scenarios are subdivided into those that lead to long term
increases t decreases, or no change in the volume of fingerprint
submissions. Figure 4-1 shows the type and source of all the
scenarios which survived the tests of plausibility as applied by the
analysis.
ORIGIN	 NOOF	 INCREASE	 DECREASE	 CHANGESCENARIO
HISTORICAL
FEDERAL
POLICY
PROJECTION
OF USERS
i
JUDICIAL
Al + N2
NO SCENARIOS, WILL NOT BE A DRIVER
N5	 #4
NO SCENARIOS. WI
TECHNOLOGICAL
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Figure 4-1. Scenario Sources and Driving Effects
1.	 Premises
The first major premise is that the underlying drivers of the
system are technological, economic, social, and political. Technology
provides capability which may become more attractive and enomically
feasible with the advance of the state of the art. Economic issues in
turn drive politics which is also driven by social issues.
B.	 SCENARIOS
Scenarios were classifed into three categories; steady state,
trends and pulses; because of the differences i n their respective
effects on the system.
t
1.	 Scenarios Leading to Increased Volume
#1 Growth in State-Submitted Applicants since 1972
Referring to Figure 2-1, which indicates the work load volume
submitted to the Identification Division during the period 1970 to
1978, there is a pronounced decrease (approximately one million per
year) in applicant cards submitted by state bureaus in 1972. This was
the direct result of a change in FBI policy. From 072 on, applicant
cards were not accepted unless a state statute required such clearing
of the applicants for their intended appointments. Subsequentlyp the
states have been passing legislation which requires applicants for
more and more occupations to be cleared by fingerprint checks at the
national level. Thisp in effect, has restored the status quo of 1970.
There are two possible scenarios to project the future:
(a) With the restoration of the 1970 level, state submissions
of applicants will reach steady state, i.e., no increase
when the pre-1970 level is reached.
(b) The growth will continue because of the increased emphasis
of the states on clearing applicants and because new
requirements emerge for social and political reasons.
#2 Criminal Inquiry Growth of 1.4%
In Figure 2-1, a dramatic decline (approximately 800,000 per
year) appears in the rate of criminal inquiries processed by the FBI
during the period 1972 to 1974. The cause of the decrease was the
change in FBI policy that defined offenses for which criminal
fingerprint cards could be submitted.
The cause of the 1.4% growth per year indicated by the data in
Figure 2-1 may be .attributed to the continuing increase in the crime
rates.
#3 Automation of Fingerprint Identification
This scenario is based on the premise that automation of the FBI
Identification Division will make full searching of all types of cards
presently submitted operationally and economically feasible.
Presently fingerprint cards submitted by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) taken on aliens legally entering the
United States are logged in by the Identification Division and sent to
the civil file without being searched in the criminal file.*
Fingerprint cards submitted by the Department of Defense taken on
recruits to the armed forces are given only a name search in the card
index section of the Identification Division.**
*Name checks are performed based on a letter inquiry submitted by INS.
**See Volume V.
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The reason for limiting the search in the two instances just
described is one of convenience. With the automated system proposed
for the Identification Division these :practices will continue even
though fingerprint searching will be automated. This is because the
management of the Identification Division chooses to automate the
present functions in their present form.
r
	
	
For several years now technology in data processing has
developed rapidly and the cost of initiating programs has shrunk.
Similarly, the cost of mass storage is rapidly decreasing and experts
believe these trends will continue. Volume II discusses the projected
reduction in computer mass memory cost over the near term future.
With these technological, advanceso the economics of anv,large
data processing function such as an automated fingerprint 	 I,
identification system can change dramatically. it is conceivable that
technological change will make new or modified functions economically
feasible in the forseeable future. This may be true both at the
national and state level.
Scenario #3 leads to the following modifications of the
operating concept within the Identification Division:
(a) New technology and the resultant.cost savings will permit
the full searching.,of all inquiries received by the
Identification Division, not just those presently being
fully searched.
(b) Real time or nearly immediate communications from all
authorized users will become available. The user
community will be finacially capable of taking advantage
of this service or the Federal Government will provide
funding for the states.
Scenario #3a would increase the volume of fingerprint searches by
causing military and immigrant submissions to be fully searched. Added
to this, ' if the draft is reinstated and if there is a national emer-
gency then the volume of military fingerprint cards will grow, possibly
to the levels of the Korean or Vietnam War era (300,000 per annum).
As mentioned in Section II.I, there is also the possibilty of an
increase in the immigration quota from its present level of 200,000
persons per year to 750,000. If this coincided with a large influx of
refugees such as the Cuban and Haitian boat people of the summer of
1980, increased volume of fingerprint searches would occur.
Foreign students are also a source of fingerprint initiated
identifications and are currently processed in the same way as
immigrants. These 20,000 additional cards per year would increase the
volume of fingerprint (technical) searches under this scenario.
Scenario #3b would lead to the implementation and operation of a
nationally distributed data communications service for identification.
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This has not been planned for the currently proposed automation system
and so is not part of the feasibility study of this proposed system.
However, in the,,second phase of the JPL study, alternatives to the
currently proposed automation concept will be studied and these will
include nationally distributed data communications (see Volume I of
this report, Compendium).
	
2.	 Scenarios Indicating No Change
#4 Stasis
Considerable evidence was uncovered by the analysis to
substantiate. the fact that to a very large extent the identification
service of the FBI is not "used" in the normal sense of that word.*
For example, many state bureaus and local agencies submit fingerprint
cards purely as a matter of procedure without waiting for a response
from the FBI. This is undoubtedly due to the long response time of
the existing federal identification system, for reasons described in
Volume V of this report, Current System Evaluation.
Consequently, no change other than those caused by demographic
forces and events such as the growth in the U.S. population through
immigration would be expected.
	
3.	 Scenarios Leading to Decreased Volume
#5 Interstate Identification Index
The National Criminal Information Center in the Technical
Services Division of the FBI is currently conducting a pilot
demonstration of the Interstate Identification Index. This pilot
project is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of the "pointer"
system which would provide the participating state's with indexes to
criminals who have previous criminal records rather than with the
records themselves. This concept can be implemented in two ways: the
FBI either providing pointers for all criminals or only foi
multi-state offenders.
Currently this pilot demonstration project is being considered
between the NCIC and the Florida State Identification Bureau on a
trial basis.
	
4.	 Trends in Work Load Volume
Figure 1-2 in Section I shows the Identification Division
Guidelines anticipated work load growth for the period from the
*Reference, conversation with Department of Justice staff.
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present to 1 0,93, the date when it is anticipated that the automated
identification system will. be fully operational. Also shown on Figure
1-2 are the ranges of variability over which the system is required to
be adaptable. These are 50% over and 50% under the 29,200 work load
anticipated in 1993. In addition, the guidelines specify a mixture of
applicant and criminal fingerprint cards with nearly equal portions of
each,
Figure 1-3 depicts the projected results of the five scenarios
described earlier. They are shown on a relative scale, emanating from
an arbitrary starting point for simplicity. Figure 1-4 shows that
only by projecting the growth trends into the future near the end of
the life cycle will the the expected work load lie outside the
guidelines of 50% over or under the given 1993 work load. On the
other hand, the growth in applicant clearance volume in scenarios #1
or #3a via a vie the III scenario, Op gives rise to a significant
change in the applicant to criminal, mixture of fingerprint cards
submitted.
The significance of this change in mixture is^ the difference it
causes in the loading of the system. Presently, 60% of all criminal
fingerprint cards are identified as a result of a successful name
check search: supported by a limited amount of other data in the card
index section.* Conservative estimates of the performance of the
automated name or subject search recently transferred to operations is
that the automated system using a more complete physical description
of the individual will find an even greater percentage in the name
search (see Volume III). Applicants, on the other hand, are rarely
found in the name check. Consequently, where most criminals inquiries
do not require fingerprint search, the vast majority of applicants
do. This places a greater burden on the fingerprint search function.
As reported in Volumes III, Operational Feasibility, and IV,
Economic Feasibility, sensitivity testing was use to exercise the
system over this dymmic range. 	 '
r
*See Volume V.
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SECTION V
THE EXTERNAL MODEL OF THE ENVIRONMENT
A	 INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the internal model discussed in Section 11, the
development of the external model (Figure 1-5, ` Section I) was based on
an extensive investigation of the different users of the services of
the Identification Division; of the hierarchy of federal agencies that
have statutory or regulatory authority for oversight and governance of
the Divisiono and of the state and local agencies whose actions may
have impact on the Division.	 A further model of the external
environment, showing competition and overlap of activities between the
1
FBI and LEAH, is shown in Figure 5-1.
t The model that emerged from these investigations is complex, as
can be seen from Figure 5-1.
	
Moreover, the complexity illustrated in
y that diagram is in fact a drastic over-simplification of the actual
I	 , situation, since it does not indicate the multiple paths of
interconnection between and among the agencies that appear, and
entirely omits some agencies and independent organizations that can be
the source of pressures and forces acting on the components shown in
the diagram.
r
B.	 METHODOLOGY
The theoretical basis of the analysis derived from the external
model has been sought in organization theory, in which considerable
recent„ attention has been given to the problems of identifying the
necessary and sufficient conditions for structural change -in
organizations.	 Analysis of these questions has provided the framework
for the investigations reported here.
1.	 Data Collection
3 Data collection for analysis within the external model created
r great methodological difficulty. 	 Within the environment of the
Identification Division there are two general classes of agencies who
are in a position to affect the Identification Division activities:
Y
(1) those agencies which are the source of work load for the Division,
e.g.t federal, state, and local agencies which submit requests for
processing; and (2) those agencies with responsibility for governance
of the Division, e.g., the Department of Justice, the Congress, etc.
For the latter, quantitative data that would be subject to
analysis and inference about the climate for change was not
available.
	 For the former, quantitative data that reveal trends in
-system use that would permit inferences about the climate for change
were available.	 However in analysis these data revealed no such
trends and suggested a highly complex environment consisting of
competing and counteracting political and economic forces.
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Thus, a decision was made to collect data on the perceptions of
members of the various agencies within these two groups concerning the
political and economic forces. that influence their decisions as makers
of policy on use and services of the Division. This created a further
methodological problem in that the questions to be asked were not
derived from any of the preconceived ideas or hypotheses about the
environment. Rather, the problem was to evstematically collect data
which were subject to analysis in the internal and external models.
The basis for the solution to this problem is found in the literature
on qualitative research methods in society, particularly the work of
Glaser } Barney, and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory,
(Reference 1).
This method of data collection involves interviews and
observations compared and analyzed in terms of their commonalities as
{	 well as their differences. This technique its called comparative
analysis. With the use of this method, the impacts of the data are
not so much the "facts" revealed by the subjects but the concepts that
support them and the categories into which these "facts" are
assigned. As data are collected, they are organized into categories,
and as categories emerge, they are integrated into a systematic
description of the environment. In this particular study the data
come from three sources:
(1) Management information supplied by the Identification
Division itself.
(2) Studies of information systems in criminal justice and law
enforcement. Particular use has been made of two recent
and thorough studies undertaken as part of the review by
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. These
studies, though incomplete during the investigation
reported here, had access to extensive collections of data
on the use of information in the criminal justice system
and carried out a review of the literature on this and
related topics.
(3) Interviews-with representatives of agencies and
institutions in the external environment of the Division.
These interviews were focused on the topics outlined
above, but the subjects who were interviewed were also
given opportunities to introduce topics of their own
concern. Analysis of the results of the interviews have
taken account of both the direct answers received and the
modes in which the answers were formulated, i.e.,
enthusiastically, indifferently, hostilely, etc.
C.	 ANALYSIS OF USE OF DIVISION SERVICES BY EXTERNAL AGENCIES
1.	 State Agencies
Analysis described in Section II discussion of the internal
model showed that submissions from agencies external to the
5-3
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Identification Division are essentially evenly balanced between those
from federal agencies on the one hand and those from state agencie0 on
the other. However, as argued, there, the overall work load is to some
extent dominated by the uses for criminal record keeping and criminal
identification. Thus some of the uses do not appear in the data on
submissions. Therefore, the use by state agencies, which are the
principal contributors of criminal inquiries, may be considered to
predominate.
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 list the criminal and applicant submissions
received from the individual states for the years 1976 through 1979.
From these tables it is clear that five states (California, Florida,
Illinoisp New York and Texas) account for almost half the total volume
of state criminal submissions and three (California, flew York and
Florida) for 35% of applicant submissions. if the states are grouped
according to volume, five (California, New York, Florida, Illinois,
and Texas) provide 48% of the volume of criminal checks and three
(California with 20X, New York, and Florida) provide 35% of the total
applicant checks. Further, a substantial number of states contribute
a smaller volume (under 50,00' per year) to the Identification
Division work load. This is summarized in Table 5-3. Although these
numbers are revealing, they do not provide measures for comparison,
since it would be expected that both kinds of submissions are related
to the populations of the states in question.
State populations would more generally be expected to be a
principal determinant of both the number of submissions and the rate
of submissions for several reasons. States with larger populations
are both more urban, with the larger fractions of their populations
residing in cities, and more likely to contain major metropolitan
centers. Generally, crime rates and rates of employment in
government, banking and the professions that require licensing and
thus the submission of applicant fingerprints are all higher in urban
and metropolitan centers. Moreover, such states would be expected to
have larger and more highly organized agencies for law enforcement
that are thus better able to make use of criminal history records and
of fingerprint identification information than the comparable agencies
s	 in smaller states. This argument suggests that the rate (per capita)
of submissions is a more revealing measure of the use by state
agencies and one that is more likely to display identifiable patterns
of use among individual states.
However, this hypothesis is not borne out by the data. In
Figure 5-2, the ;states are arranged in decending order of population
in 1978, beginning with California at 22 million and ending with
Wyoming at 400,000. Keeping the states in this order, Figure 5--3
displays the rates per capita of criminal submissions and Figure 5-4,
the rates per capita of applicant submissions. Inspection of these
convincing displays demonstrates the essentially random distribution
of the rates with respect to the populations. Rates of criminal
r
*Used here, the term "state agencies" refers to all state, and local
users.
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Table 5-1 Criminal Fingerprint Submissions
State FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979
Alabama 31,250 27,096 23,312 27,288
Alaska 7,558 7,462 6,629 7,233
Arizona 31,220 30,375 28,152 32,093
Arkansas 80600 9`526 8,590 89449
California 502,921 485,911 472,847 396,186
Colorado 26,583 24,020 21,790 25,661
Connecticut 32,340 31,348 29,751 30,363
Delaware 11,350 90844 9,180 8,703
Washington, D.C. 8,497 1,044 317 582
Florida 148,049 149,479 150,868 173,101.
Georgia 810752 86,009 890048 81,545
Hawaii 5,543 81013 7,597 6,702
Idaho 5,362 4,914 4,722 6,629
Illinois 151,153 133,675 1350352 153,230
Indiana 25,506 190828 19,137 18,133
Iowa 14,128 17,638 16,819 15,525
Kansas 16,330 17,395 17,519 181722
Kentucky 17,916 15,725 17,317 17,418
Louisiana 44,467 430690 46,765 48,230
Maine 3,793 3,238 4;531 5,262
Maryland 67,999 701810 68,888 701918'
4ta wa achusetts 17t645 18,979 7,71312 149849
Michigan 81,194 58,166 58,917 54,244
Minnesota 81185 10,265 11,144 11,026
Mississippi 6,168 8,516 9,123 81479
Missouri 38,392 37,574 30,164 30,327
Montana 3 ,453 3,729 39510 30213
Nebraska 71747 7,729 6,467 4,702
Nett Hamphire 2,844 3,412 31124 3,852
New Jersey 85,467 92,225 80,218 799310
New Mexico 1.31009 16,443 16,888 16,241
New York 296,714 301,276 329,458 312,396
North Carolina 31,156 36,667 37,743 410686
North Dakota 11170 11297 1,358 10201
Nevada 161419 17,741 18,322 19,419
Ohio 70,228 68,897 66,542 69,582
Oklahoma 16,827 16,281 18,478 18,374
Oregon 220595 27,428 29,993 33,142
Pennsylvania 73,941 74,940 69,134 65,776
Rhode Island 5,180 5,167 5,012 5,452
South Carolina 171219 439925 65,760 781245
South Dakota 3,978 51610 5,930 4,018
Tennessee °31,702 329484 30,875 33,499
Texas 128,823 1230243 133,498 132,199
Utah 11,013 11,991 129432 15,382
Vermont 10338 1,046 1,022 11512
Virginia 579723 53,524 55,733 609911
Washington 32,386 32,086 29,554 29,345
West Virginia 4,753 4,059 4,112 6,300
Wisconsin 27,897 23,719 22,592 23,119
Wyoming 2,757 2,833 2,757 2'.,444
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Table 5-2. Licensing ..And ,Applicant Fingerprint Submissions
State FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979
Alabama 2,794 1!820 30189 20706
Alaska 1,484 2,725 2,875 2,389
Arizona 190035 27x174 440621 46,855
Arkansas 2,239 30087 3,894 40030
California 111,550 1370525 159,160 2050026
Colorado 17,401 16,231 190256 170660
Connecticut 121730 11,146 9,351 80451
Delaware 10380 1,941 2,517 30350
Washington, D.C. 12,916 26,903 110411 12,403
Florida 97,349 71,769 103,626 89,991
Georgia 17,248 56,139 43,798 350997
11swaii 548 727 571 453
Idaho 8,870 110159 10,094 8,070
Illinois 22,275 =211256 26,355 38,159
Indiana 71588 8,311 7,949 3,148
Iowa 2,247 21851 6,040 20764
Kansas 2,599 1,340 10059 10100
Kentucky 1,553 990 1,965 1,764
Louisiana 9,472 8,147 50938 3,655
Maine 556 291 299 589
Maryland 14,197 170099 20,228 22,754
Massachusetts 112,537 3r 761 2^A77 2i815
Michigan 7,827 80994 80257 60187
Minnesota 826 578 682 615
Mississippi 746 765 929 1,000
Missouri 7,394 7,891 70699 8,919
Montana 439 602 514 502
Nebraska 744 10010 10129 951
New Hampshire 758 724 10179 10320
New Jersey 860346 790514 750587 740953
New Mexico 60494 60695 7,172 60.214
New York 1170504 58,134 1190077 910051
North Carolina 110032 120137 12,607 13,436
North Dakota 111 150 200 67
Nevada 461389 490112 460975 30,832
Ohio 22,858 100506 20,038 210887
Oklahoma 20392 20480 20747 2,829
Oregon 8,033 904`17 8,816 90397
Pennsylvania 17.0247 15,770 130427 140709
Rhode Island 10051 668 10799 10010
South Carolina 100811 90695 8,837 110448
South Dakota 414 517 393 350
Tennessee 50915 70104 50990 79656
Texas 12ti546 130392 190028 250219
Utah 787 840 930 10008
Vermont 30511 866 10318 11308
Virginia 50730 50132 80098 13,043
Washington 33,064 349941 370826 39,972
West Virginia 607 815 586 822
Wisconsin 20702 20704 3,478 30704
Wyoming 224 172 186 227
wi
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Table 5-3. Categories of Submission Levels by Status
hl^w^e^w?MM.^
Number of
Submissions	 Criminal	 civil
10,000 or less
	
17	 33
10 9 000 to 5Cj000	 20	 14
50 0 000 to I00,0O0	 9	 3
1O0,000 or more
	
5	 1
	
51	 51
submissions vary by a factor of 20 between Nevada at 27.7 per capita
and North Dakota at 1.7 per capita, and the rates associated with the
larger states of the left side of the figure are not consistently
higher than those of the smaller states on the right side. Aliplicant
submission rates per capita vary even more widely, by a factor of more
than 100 between Nevada at 44 per capita and Mississippi at 0. 4 per
capita. (Related statistics for the years 1976 through 1975 are given
in Appendix B.)
Additional. calculations were carried out using sta_iptical
techniques, and the results confirmed the difficulties in analytical
classification of state submissions. Crime rates, for example, appear
to explain less than 50% of the variance in criminal submissions,
despite the fact that these rates were calculated on the basis of a
well-defined collection of "major crimes" derived from data collected
from state and local law enforcement agencies and thus would be
expected to display close correlation with criminal submissions.*
The failure to obtain evidence of the expected relationship
between the populations of states and the rates and numbers of submis-
sions suggested that other methods of analyzing the patterns of state
submissions be attempted. For this purpose the patterns of state
submissions over time were investigated graphically with the purpose
of identifying subgroups of states displaying consistent increases or
decreases in submissions and consistent ratios of criminal and
applicant submissions. The results for the four years for which data
were available are shown in Figure 5-5. in these figures, the
vertical bars with shading indicate the number of criminal submissions
for each year, '1976 through 1979, for each state, and the unshaded
vertical bars indicate applicant submissions for the same years.
*Although data on sets of observations smaller than the available 50
data points for the states are regularly used for multivariate
statistical analysis, such analysis is not securely applicable and
can yield misleading results.
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It is immediately clear from these figures that not only do the
ratios of criminal to applicant submissions; vary enormously among the
states but that increases and decreases in the two kinds of submissions
fail to display consistent patterns even in single states, let alone in a
groups of states.
The explanation for this diversity in the use by the states of
the services of tbt	 Ident ification Division is to be found in the C
diversity of the states themselves;	 in the demographic, economic and
regional characteris6lcs that determine social patterns and equally if
not more importantly, in the idiosyncratic characteristics of state
'	 laws and regulations governing law enforcement and requirements for
employment and licensing.	 The implications for the analysio of the
external environment users of Identification Division's services are
clear.	 A reliable and comprehensive analysis of use by state agencies
requires necessarily a state-by-state investigation in some considerable
depth,
	
In particular, understanding must, be acquired of the uses in
each state to which the information sent to the Identification Division
and received from it is put and of the value in use of the information.
I	 Not only is such a study far outside the scope of analysis
reported here, but the record keeping on which such studies are
•	 necessarily based does not exist.	 Records are not kept of such
important aspects of information as the recipients of information
received by state and local agencies, the constraints on its
dissemination, the destinations and eventual disposi0 on of the
information.	 The presence of redundance in the various local, state
F	 and	 ,at.onal systems of criminal information is strongly suggested by
the observations discussed above, but the extent of the redundance and
its costs inferred from final uses can not be estimated on the basis of
existing data.
Implications of the analysis reported here will be discussed
below in the sections dealing with the sources of structural change in
state agencies.	 At this point it is sufficient to indicate that the
diversity of uses and purposes of each of the states for information in
the Identification Division system suggested by these observations
implies the lack of coherence in efforts originating in states to change
existing patterns of organization whether or not these patterns are
satisfactory to them.
2.	 In-State Identification Systems
In surveying state practices for the purpose of rating each state
on the basis of information capability and information use, the User
Study (Reference 5) inquired about two features of state systems that
are useful to this study.*	 One feature was state criminal history
*This study surveyed only 43 states and excluded New York. 	 We have
added New York and included it in our discussions based on our
interviews there.
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Figure 5-2. Census Bureau 1978 Statistics
5-9
i
FBI
IDENTIFICATION
'!VIS1ON
1910:^'T,,ATISTICS
AVERAGE = 8.82
MEDIAN - 7.0
I
N
^' J Z
V
lo
F
r
r" ^
k
r
Z
lo
^
g
IL C7 k
r
t
^)
N Z t
t
n Z
~
O
1D
N^
33
^11 ^( OD N^
N b IO ^ ^ ^ OI	 ^ I ^ G
Ln
z]L N	 to nILAJ = c^ H
m
^p
O Q1
U, r,
Z lo q ZIX Q ^*
Q
O
ri
I,,
N 1^ W OOH
V ; e^ Y
a
trD W
w
Z !
N'QN Z _ NZ ^ Z
oe
tu
Z Z J.EL
*Median value on the basis of population.
Figure 5-3. FBI Identification Division 1978 Criminal Statistics,
Per Capita
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filar, which are presumed to correspond to the Identification
Division's criminal history record-keeping facilities. (This should
not be construed to necessarily moan that state files contain the some
information as Identification Division files.) in evaluating the
records the User Study grouped states according to the degree to
which a state's records were automated. These categories and the
number of states assigned to each are shown in Table 5-4,
Table 5-4, State Development of Criminal Justice
Information Systemsa
Categories	 Number of	 States
Partial manual file	 4
Manual file	 14
Comprehensive manual file and
automated index
	
0
Automated criminal history ,filet
initial conversion	 4
Automated criminal history fil,e,
ongoing conversion	 21
aSee Reference 5 0
 pp. 163-65.
A review of these states that are fully automated reveal that
they include the five largest contributors to Identification Division
records.
The second feature examined by the User Study (Reference 5) was
centralizing reporting. This category reflects the degree to which
local agencies reported or submitted to their state either voluntarily
or in accordance with state law. This analysis was designed to draw
some conclusions regarding the completeness of state files. It also
provides some indication of how frequently local police submit
directly to the Identification Division. These figures are summarized
in Table 5-5.
An analysis of Table 5-5 reveals that the five largest contri-
butors to the Identification Division all have mandatory reporting.
A review of the present situation from an operational view
suggests two working hypothesis which merit investigation: (l) that
the Identification Division work load is primarily a function of the
technological development of the statep when there are controls- for
population differences; and (2) that those states that are interested
in criminal justice information have active and well-developed systems
Table -5. Summary of State Reporting
Roquirements and practical a'
No centralized reporting 	 g	 (l8)
Partial report ing	 17	 (34X)
Full. reporting ( required by 13)
	 19	 (43X')
a See Reference 5, pp. 165-172
and those that do not are not likely to do so, This latter conclusion
can be further tested by reviewing the situation with regard to the
regulation of criminal justice information.
3.	 Federal Agencies
As discussed in Section I, the criminal submissions from federal
agencies to the Identification Division constitute a relatively small
fraction of criminal submissions (11%) and an almostnegligible
__frSCt^.on vYr 'tvtal otiuurxaai:vctis Na% ' : nvwGVCr , ran of app Ii- ant
submissions are from federal agencies, corresponding to 42% of total
submissions.
All federal agencies are able to use Identification Division
services for either criminal justice or checks on applicants for
(federal) employment. Data on the source of requests for fingerprint
identification from federal agencies are not available, so the
aggregate data in the figures above are the only kind of information
that could be obtained on federal users of criminal identification and
record keepingo
A breakdown is shown of applicant submissions by federal
agencies in Table 5-6.
Of the total. submissions from federal agencies for non -criminal
uses, more than half ( 59%) come from the Department of Defense, 387.
come from the Office of Personnel Management, and 21% as part of the
security and background investigations to which certain federal appli-
cants and the employees of certain federal contractors are subject.
In contrast to the dispersion of uses among state agencies, the
use of Identificaton Division services by federal agencies are thus
relatively easily characterized t with well-defined statutory and
regulatory limits on the submissions from each agency. These
observations have been used to select the federal agencies for further
investigation by interview.
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Table 5-6 Secondary Usage of Identification Division
by Faderal Agencies, FY 1978
Purpose of Use	 Fingerprint Cards Submitted
Federal Employment
Army	 191,445
Air Force	 82,228
Navy	 95,05+
Marine Corps	 54,951
Coast Guard	 30p522
Office of Personnel Management	 330,602
Miscellaneous federal agencies 	 450476
Subtotal	 . 830 0 278	 (34X)
Other EmployMent Subject to Federal Regulations
Federally chartered/insured banks
	
2689623
Securities industry	 72,600
Subtotal	 .	 . 341,223	 (14X)
FederalIX-Related Employment (Contractors, security clearances)
Department of Energy 251101
Defense Investigative Service 281,945
Department of Transportation 1!561
Other federal agencies 160,336
Subtotal	 .	 .	 .	 . .468 9 943	 (19X)
f	 Non-Employment Secondary Users
Department of State (primarily for aliens
entering the United States) 268,167
Veterans Administration (establishing
entitlement to benefits) 3,323
lY	 Immigration and Naturalization Service
(persons applying for naturalization#
citizens applying for adoption of
foreign-born childrenp etc.) 534,931
Subtotal
	
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 806,421	 (34X)
TOTAL All Federal Secondary Users . 	 .	 . .	 . . 2,4469865
Reference:	 User Study, Office of Technology Assessment.
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D.	 FEDERAL REGULATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
A detailed review of the .,federal regulations concerning arrest
and disposition information is contained in Appendix A` of this reportAP	 -	 Pr;
and in the Social Impacts Study (Reference 6, {gyp. 281-356).
	
A review -JI
of these regulations indicates that the federal government has chosen
to regulate arrest and disposition information at the point of
management and dissemination.	 Appendix A reveals almost exclusive
reliance on purging and sealing, and regulations pertaining to
dissemination for regulation.	 The only regulations pertaining to
collection are those that pertain to criterion offenseep 0hich define
what offenses will' be included in Identification Division rap sheets.
Further, the Socia4 , ,Impacts Study reveals three"aasu +mptions in
federal regulations that indicate the limited extent to which federal
held
tIdentification\Divisiou_,(Reference y6g 	 assumptions, pp.	 300-301 ) .	 These
y^ are;	 \..
I (l)	 Agencies have broad daarrett' on w ithin 'thee regulations.
(2)	 Participation -is voluntary as the program is viewed as a-,
service to the states send local law enforcement agencies.*
(3)	 Policy evolves on a case by case basis in responso to
legisl€at-Wr or court rases.
What is,,revealed here is the limited opportunity federal agencies
S have in using regulations of the system as a means of managing it and
planning for its future_.	 This'is primarily due''to its voluntary
' nature.	 4^s the Social Impacts Study points out, any attempt to over-
regulate 'the system would violate the state ' s rights principle? that has
revailod in law enforcement for manU - ,	 ,,	 y Years (see .Reference 6 9	 p.	 301).
Over-regulation'could be explicit and result in states pulling out and
eventually the system would disappear.
	
Federal regulations are faced
with the difficult problem of balancing public policy regarding
maintenance and dissemination of arrest and disposition information
and the need to monitor the entire system.	 From a federal view, there
is little within the regulatory .system to promote change. >'
E.	 STATE REGULATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
4
i The Social Impacts Study contains an extensive review and some
` evaluation of state regulation.of criminal justice information
(Reference 6, pp. 304-356).	 While this reviiew confirms the hypotheses
-. that stateP' are likely to attempt to control outcomes through
,. x
*Interv .ews at the Identification Division revealed the extent to
'. which this	 part ir.
^
n.
 
'We tre really here Division. 	 service'.
were common.
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legislation and regulation, there are no patterns which emerge that
give solid indication of future trends. The Social. Impacts Study
reports; "...there is some evidence to support almost any reasonable
policy arguments various actors care to make," (Reference 6, pp. 338).
The foregoing analysis provides insight into some operational
.aspects of the Identification Division. These aspects fail to reveal
any major trends toward change among the users of the system.
Further, the analysis fails to reveal that one source of activity
generates substantially more work than another. With regard to
activity by source, federal employment checks provide the greatest
activity in the identification function (39%) and in the record-
checking subfunction. On the other hand, state employment checks and
criminal checks generate about an equal amount of activity (13% and
14%) in the identification function. State criminal checks generate
the largest amount of activity in the criminal history record-keeping
function, i.e., record changes.
F.	 CONCLUSIONS
1.	 Conclusions About the Work Load
With regard to the possibility of change starting with the users
of the system, there is evidence that there will be little change in
that area. The analysis reveals that those states that are major users
of Identification Division services are those which have extensive
criminal justice information capabilities and are likely to retain and
upgrade them; those who are not major users do not have sophisticated
systems and are not likely to acquire them. Further analysis reveals
that federal legislation and regulation of criminal justice information
is not likely to be an effective tool for bringing about change.
Specific facts supporting these conclusions are:
(1) 48% of the work load for the Identification Division comes
from five states.
(2) 72% of the states each have 50,000 annual criminal
applicant checks or less.
(3) The top five states in criminal submissions all have
automated systems and require centralized reporting.
(4) With one exception, the top five states in applicant sub-
missions all have automated systems and centralized reporting.
(Arizona has only partial centralized reporting.)
(5) Because of the voluntary nature of the system, federal
regulation of arrest and disposition of information
collection is not as effective as state regulation in
controlling the system.
(6) The wide variation in regulatory practices among the
states makes it impossible to generalize about them.
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To further test these conclusions, additional study should beia	
undertaken to determine the following:
(1) The actual use and value of arrest and disposition
information in the criminal justice system.
(2) An estimate of what proportion of all criminal records in
the country are held in the Identification Division.
(3) The priorities which states give to expenditures for
criminal justice information systems.
(4) The impact of improved state systems on the Identification
Division.
;(5)	 Various state policies regarding privacy. , (Only
inferences about these policies are drawn from other
studies.)
(6) The interest of law enforcement agencies in interstate
crime and criminals. (This, however, is currently being
addressed by Stanford Research Institute in a study
commissioned by LEAA.)
(7) The relationship between certain demographic variables of
states, i.e., population, population density, per capita
income, etc., and state use of the Identification Division,.
Such studies can be expected to verify the equilibrium situation
and provide better insight into the impact of environmental change.
2.	 AIDS III System Design Conclusions
External environmental analysis rer;lilted in the conclusion that
it would not be possible to predict events in a mannr that would be
useful to the system designers. This conclusion was reached for two
reasons. First, it is well known that specific events are difficult
to predict. Further, it is difficult to determine, a priori, whether
events, even if they could be predicted, represent trends that should
be accounted for in designing a system, or whether they are impluses
whose impact subsides as the environment returns to normal.
Second, there has been no systematic evaluation of the benefits
of the information provided by the Identification Divisins to various
users.* Because the benefits are unknowns the reasons and motives for
using the system are unknown. Because the motives for using the
system are unknown, the response of users to any particular event
cannot be predicted with sufficient confidence to be useful in
evaluating alternative designs.
*This conclusion is also reached by the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment's User Study (see Reference 5).
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APPENDIX A
'LEGAL CLIMATE IN WHICH THE IDENTIFICATION DIVISION OPERATES
A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO OPERATE AN IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
The FBI Identification Division's authority to establish and
maintain criminal and civil identification files in found is 28 USC §
534 (1968).	 In part,	 this statute authorizes the Attorney General to
acquire, collect, classify, and preserve criminal, identification, and
other records, and to exchange them with authorized officials of
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and with penal and
4
other institutions.	 The Attorney General has delegated this authority
to the Director of the FBI, and the task is currently performed by the
FBI's Identification Division. 	 ibis delegation of authority and the
rules put forth b}„the Department of Justice concerning the
administration of the statute are codified in Title 28_ ) Code of t
Federal Regulations (CFR).
	 In addition, a 1976 amendul6nt to the
Omnibus Crime. Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L. No. 90-351f
82 Stat. 200 (1968), adding a Section 524 (42 USC	 § 3771) directs the
executive branch to assure that the privacy of criminal history
information is adequately provided for
	 by P.L. No."(reorganized
96-157, §	 818 9	 3 Stat.	 1212 (1979) as,43:USC
	 § 3789g	 (Supp.	 1980).
Some of the regulations in 28 CFR Part 20 were issued pursuant to this
congressional privacy standard.
r
B.	 CONTENT OF THE FILES
A description of what information may be stored in criminal
history records may be found in 28 CFR § 20.2 (1975).
	
This includes
"identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions,
indictments and information, or other formal criminal charges, and any
disposition arising therefrom,” and details as to sentencing,
correctional supervision and release (Id). 	 Only serious and/or
significant offenses may be stored in these records (28 CFR §
	 20.329
1975.	 it specifically excludes as nonserious offenses "drunkenness,
vagrancy, disturbing the peace, curfew violation, loitering, false
fire a"farm, non-specific charges of suspicion or investigation, and
traffic violation'" (Id). 	 Offenses committed by juvenile offenders are
also specifically excluded unless the juvenile is tried in court as an
adult.
C iy`
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (1974) resulted in judicial
examination of the content of the FBI's criminal history files. 	 It
I	 involved a suit against the FBI for expungement of a state
(California) arrest record retained by the FBI.
	
It had been
established at the state level that there was no probable cause for
k	 the arrest, and the status of the proceeding was changed from "arrest"
to "detention."	 The 'FBI had been so notified, and had amended its
record to show that the subject's encounter with the police was not
considered to be an arrest under California law, and that no formal
^;	 '	 ^ 'A	 ^^A0^	 lA^1
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proce,ed ,ings had been brought against him. The court determined that
once !Mhe FBI was notified that the subject was not involved in the
criminal justice process, it had no authority to retain the record in
the criminal files, even though the record accurately portrayed the
events as they had occurred. The statute only authorizes the storage
of formal criminal proceedings in the criminal files. The court
stated that the Identification Division has a responsibility to
maintain an appropriate separation of its files, and to assure that it
does not disseminate criminal files containing inappropriate
information. This includes an obligation to review the proprie " of
continuing to retain a record in the criminal files in light of new
information received abcu t a subject. The decision was carefully
grounded on statutory consi 4,erations, but the court left as an open
question the extent to which this decision is mandated by the
Constitution. If it is a constitutional requirement, it cannot be
dispensed with by statute.
One problem that arises out of this decision and that is
currently unresolved within the identification Division is what to do
with the fingerprints of suspects who undergo pretrial diversion.
This alternative to the usual judicial process is sometimes employed
when the U.S. Attorney determines that the suspect's infraction of the
law was due to an unfortunate set of circumstances and is not likely
to be repeated. The suspect is sometimes formally arrested, and at
other times not. Instead of going through the usual criminal process,
he agrees to a set of conditions, which usually involve some sort of
restitution to the victim and a period of probation. if he
successfully fulfills his obligations under the agreement, charges are
either dismissed or never brought. The unresolved question is whether
pretrial diversion qualifies as a formal criminal process tinder
Section 534 when the suspect is not actually arrested. The FBI
retains all of the fingerprints now, but its authority to do so is
uncertain after Menard. The Identification Division has requested
legislative direction in this matter, but so far none has been
forthcoming.
C.	 UPDATING OF RECORDS
i
	
	 On May 20, 1975, the Department of Justice issued regulations
prohibiting dibsemination of arrest information more than one year old
unless accompanied by a disposition when no active prosecution of 'the
charge is known to be pending (28 CFR § 20.33, 1975). This
prohibition does not apply to records released for law enforcement
purposes or to authorized federal agencies. This regulation came in
the wake of Tarleton v. Saxbe 507 F.ld 1116 (1974) in which the court
expresPed concern about the impairment of an individual's liberty that
results when he stands accused of a crime. It noted that the reason
for the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is to mitigate this
restriction of the accused's liberty, and the court suggested that the
lower court inquire into what justifications, if any, exist for the
FBI's failure to indicate dispositions within a reasonable time after
arrest. Two years later the district court order in Tarleton v. Saxbe
l
r
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407 F. Supp, 1083 (1976) directed the FBI to conduct a feasibility
study of system procedures that would enable it to keep disposition
entries in its criminal records reasonably current. By the time the
study was conducted the FBI had solved the immediate problem by
promulgating 28 CFR § 20.33 (1975). Most of the systems and
procedures suggested by the study for keeping the disposition data
more current were designed for use in a computerized system.
The Identification Division now gets dispositions for about 45%
of the arrests reported, including those it gets from the FBI itself.
Regulation 28 .CFR § 20.37 (1975) makes it the responsibility of each
criminal justice agency contributing data to the criminal history
record information system to assure that information is kept complete,
accurate, and current. This regulation calls for dispositions to be
submitted within 120 days after the disposition has occurred
However, the only sanction available for enforcing this policy is
regulation 28 CFR § 20.38 (1975) which permits the Department of
Justice to cancel its criminal record services to any agency that
fails to comply with its regulations. AIDS III will probably be
programmed to ask submitting agencies for dispositions if they are not
received within a certain period of time after receipt of the record.
! If this new procedure is successful, the Identification Division can
expect an increase in its work load, as it will have to process this
additional information.
Pursuant to 28 CFR § 20.3.2 (1975) the Identification Division no
longer records minor and juvenile offenses. This regulation went into
effect in June 1975. It does not require the FBI to expunge
information on minor offenses previously compiled. However, the
district court's order in Tarleton v. Saxbe 407 F. Supp. 1083 (1976)
required the FBI to delete from the record, pricr to dissemination,
all information relating to nonserious offenses The FBI is deleting
these offenses from records that have been requested as they are sent
out. In each case the complete record is retyped so that it does not
appear that information is missing. However, the FBI does not discard
the fingerprint cards that are the source of its information on these
offenses. The reason for this is that its system of verifying
identification depends on matching each set of prints with the one
previously received. Removing a set of prints from this string would
entail reidentifying the next set with the new set which immediately
precedes it. When AIDS III file conversion occurs, these nonserious
offenses will not be transferred to the system.
The FBI currently expunges and seals records persuant to state
4
	
	
and federal court orders. Authority for sealing of the record of a
person who has been found guilty of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance is found in 21 USG § 844(b)(1) (1972). U he has
not previously been convicted of violation of any federal narcotics
Taws, the court may, after trial or entry of a guilty plea, place him
on probation without entering a judgment of guilty. If he doe's not
violate any conditions of the probations the court may dismiss the
proceedings. The Department of Justice retains a record of the
proceeding solely to determine first offender status in subsequent
proceedings.
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Section 844(b)(2) of 'Title 21 states that if the person is under
21 years of age, he may apply for a court order to expunge all records
	
F	 relating to the incident other than the non-public records to be
retained by the Justice Department under Section 844(b)(1). This
provision is of minor importance now as the Identification Division
does not retain the records of juveniles unless they are tried as
adults.
Twenty-three states now provide processes whereby a subject can
have non-convictions purged from his record, and 13 provide a
procedure for purging records of convictions. Fifteen states provide
for sealing of records of non-conviction, and 20 provide for sealing
	
f	 of convictions. Sealing and purging statutes should not be aggregated
to determine the number of states that provide for one or the other,
as some state statutes qualify as both. Thirty-one states now have
some provision for limiting dissemination of convi9tions, 25 provide
for limiting dissemination of non-convictions. During the last three
	
C	 years provisions for sealing and purging conviction records have more
	I	 than doubled. (See Privacy and Security of Criminal History
InformaC ion, prepared by George B. Trubow for LEAA under LEAA contact
7_-0-55i'-­M-LEAA.)   
The JPL study examined the statutes of Arizona, Arkansas, and
California, three states which have some provision of this type, and
contacted officials in the state court systems to find out what
procedure, if any, the state has for notifying the FBI of a change in
status of one of its criminal history records. Arizona's statutes
call for the setting aside of convictions, except that they may be
pleaded and proved in subsequent prosecutions (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
13-90, 1970)• However, what in fact happens under this statute is
that the person who has been convicted and has served his punishment
may apply for a restoration of his civil rights. If his petition is
granted he receives a certificate to that effect, but his record is
still available for dissemination and the FBI is not even notified
that this process has taken place.
Arkansas provides for purging "all records ...relating to a
crime wherein the person has been acquitted or the charges dismissed"
(Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 5-1109, 1475). Arkansas also provides for the
sequestering of records of first offenders so that they are available
only to law enforcement and judicial officials (Ark. Stat, Ann.
§ 43-1231 9 1975). When either of the processes occurs, the court
sends a copy of the order to the Arkansas State Identification
Division And the FBI Identification Division.
The California Penal Code allows a defendant who has been
acquitted to file a motion to seal the record of his arrest and
acquittal (Cal. Penal Code § 851.8, Deering Supp., 1980).
California's procedure is to forward a copy of the judge's order
sealing the record to law enforcement agencies, including the FBI.
I
	
	
The FBI reports that the number of fingerprint cards and related
documents removed in response to court ordered expungements has
G	 increased from 57,370 in 1976 9
 to 92,116 in 1977, to 106,986 in 1978.	 N
i
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On August 18 ► 1976, The Department of Justice instituted a
procedure by which an individual, upon request and verification of his
identity, may review the criminal history information Waintained on
him. If he wants any changes in his record he may apply to the
contributor of the information. If the contributor corrects the
record it must notify the FBI, and the FBI will make any changes
necessary in accordance with the corrections (28 CFR § 20.34, 1975)
The FBI processed 270 of these challenges in FY 1977 and 320 in FY
1978.
D.	 DISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION
Recipients of criminal history information are limited by 28
USC § 534 (1968) to law enforcement agencies, penal and other
institutions. In 1971, the district court for the District of
Columbia decided Menard y. Mitchell 328 F. Supp. 718 (1971), holding
that other institutions refer to other official justice and law
enforcement institutions only. Prior to this decision, the FBI had
been providing criminal history records to states for employment and
licensing checks. Zmmed is to ly after  this dec is ion, Congress responded
by passing the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce ? the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1973, P.L. No.
92-544, § 2 9 86 Stat. 1109 (1972) allowing the FBI to disseminate this
information to officials of federally chartered or insured banking
institutions. It also permits dissemination to state and local
government agencies for purpose's of employment and licensing if the
check is authorized by a state statute and approved by the Attorney
General. It is the responsibility of the Attorney General to balance
the injury to individual privacy interests against the states' needs
to have this information in deciding whether or not to approve the
statute.
Additionallyt in 1975 Congress amended the Securities Exchange
Act, § 17 (15 USC 78q(F)(2)) to require every member of a national
securities exchange, and every broker, dealer, registered transfer
agent, and registered clearinghouse agency, to undergo an FBI
fingerprint check.
Dissemination of criminal histories to federal agencies
authorized to receive it is permitted pursuant to federal statute or
executive order,: 28 CFR § 20.33(2) (1975).
It has already been noted that dissemination of sealed records
and records of arrests more than a year old without dispositions are
limited to law enforcement agencies.
The Department of Justice has, in the wake of Menard v. Mitchell,
strictly construed the statutes governing dissemination of criminal
history files. It has .revised its earlier position under 28 USC §
534 (1968) and now refuses to allow access, directly or 'through state
law enforcement agencies, to railroad police and campus 1lol.ice. Even
though they may be authorized by state statute to investilpte crimes
or apprehend criminals, the Department of Justice does not find these
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groups to be authorized government officials under the meaning of
Section 534. It has also refused, under P.L. 92-544 supra, to provide
criv3nal history records to state boards of bar examiners when the
board is established by rule of the state supreme court rather than by
a statute. Section 536d(b)(4) of the proposed FBI charter would
a+ithorize the FBI to exchange criminal history information with law
enforcement organizations authorized by state statute to investigate
crimes or apprehend criminals on interstate common carriers.
Once the criminal history records leave the FBI's control, the
only sanction ,-tvailable to enforce FBI dissemination policies is 28
CFR § 20.33(b)(1975): This provides that the exchange of criminal
history record information with authorized recipients is subject to
cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving department
or related agencies.
E .	 FREEDOM OF INFORMATIO.: J;D PRIVACY ACTS
Under the Freedom of Information Act $
 P.L. No. 89-487 9
 80 $tat.
250 (codified at 5 USC § 552, 1977) } all government agencies are
required to supply copies of their records to any member of the public
who requests them (5 USC § 552(a)(3)). It has been established that
this act applies to computer tapes to the same extent that it applies
to other records (Long V. U.S. IRS 596 F.2d 362 1 1979)9 However }
 the
act provides -everal categories of exemptions. Matters that are
exempt under another statutep if the statute leaves the agency no
discretion or supplies particular criteria for applying the exemption:
may be withheld from the public (5 USC § 552(b)(3)). If disclosure of
a file would constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy" it need not be disclosed (5 USC § 552(b)(6)). Investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes are exempt if release
would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" (5
USC § 552(b)(6C)). Note that the privacy standard for these records
is less strict than the privacy standard for other records. There are
other exemptions covering law enforcement records but they are of
limited application (see 5 USC § 552(b)(7)). If the agency invokes
one of these exceptions it must release any reasonably segregable
portion after deleting the exempt portions.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to this statute allow the
Attorney General to exempt the whole system of identification records
from public disclosure. This exemption is noted in the Department of
Justice regulations (28 CFR § 16.10, 1973) and is uniformly applied to
exempt all criminal histories from disclosure.
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC § 552a, 1977) was passed shortly
thereafter to protect the privacy interests of individuals by
regulating the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
personal information by federal agencies. However, it permits-
dissemination of information required by the Freedom of Information
Act 2
 and the general feeling is that the Privacy Act has very little
impact.
F.	 IMPACT OF THE NEW CHARTJA
The proposed charter will not substantively affect the
Identification Division's management of criminal history records. It
incorporates the language of 28 uSC § 534, which authorizes the FBI to
acquire, collects classify, and preserve civil and criminal
fingerprint records and criminal history information. The charter
also authorizes exchange of this information with all of the current
recipients, and additionally with law enforcement organizations
authorized by state statute to investigate crimes or apprehend
criminals on interstate carriers. It also prohibits the FBI from
furnishing arrest data unaccomprnied by a disposition for encployment
or licensing checks or from furnishing data to federal agencies for
use in background investigations.
G	 OTHER LEGISLATION
A number of bills introduced in Congress during the early and
mid 1970's addressed the maintenance of a criminal records system. A
bill introduced by Senator Roman HiusMa (R-Neb.), S. 2462, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), included a detailed treatment of record security.
In early 1973, H.R. 188, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), and H.R. 9783,
93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), were introduced. These bills contained
confidentiality provisions for arrest records, including sealing and
purging standards. All of these bills died in committee. It has now
►'seen five yeawss since Congress considered comprehensive justice
information legislation. There has been some Congressional attention
given to the security of medical and financial records, but none
recently to criminal history data. It is difficult to know the degree
to which this issue has settled. If it still is a live issue with
Congress, it would not be surprising if the implementation of AIDS III
brings a new round of legislation aimed at controlling the use of
criminal history information.
Similarly, the judicial climate recently seems to have become
more conservative. In the 1974 Tarleton decision the court discussed
the constitutional right of liberty, and the possible curtailment of
this right tha t, occurs when a person stands accused of a crime.
However, in a 1976 decision the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated when his name was
included on a list of active shoplifters circulated by a police chief
among local merchants, even though he had been arrested for
shoplifting once 17 months before and had never been prosecuted. (See
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 1976).
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEWS
REPRESENTATIVE
Mr. Donald Forkus
Mr. Adam Delesandro
Sgt. William Wamness
Detective Sgt. Daniel T. Lovett
Mr. Ronald Gobb
Mr. Gary McAlway
Captain Donald Johnson,
Commanding Officer
Detective Leo Tschuldi
Mr. Charles Jacobs,
Bureau Chief
Lt. Wayne Tucker
AGENCY
Chief of Police; Brea, Cali£o
Director of Data Systems;
New York State Identification
Bureau
Boston Police Department
Administrative Assistant to t
Secretary; Massachusetts
Department of Public Safety
SEARCH, Inc.
Illinois State Identification
Bureau
Central Records Division;
New York City Police Departme
Crime Information Bureau;
State of Florida
Police Department;
Oakland,, California
Mr. Robert Garden	 Department of Justice Staff
Mr. Robin Skinner
Mr. Lawrence Lawler	 National Crime Information
Center, FBI
Mr. Robert N. McNamara, Jr.
	
Senate Judiciary Committee
Ms. Carol Kaplan 	 Law Enforcement Assistance Agency
Mr. Smiley Ashton
The Study task attended an IAI fleeting with the following state
identification agencies:
Mr. H.
-
A. Albert; Texas
Mr. Paul Schultz; Washington
Mr. Charles Jacobs; Florida
Mr. Jerrry McAlway; Illinois
Mr. Gray Buckley; Colorado
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APPENDIX D
ACRONYMS
ACS
	
Automated Classification System
AFRS	 Automated Fingerprint Reader System
AHU	 Anti-Halation Underlayer
AIDS
	
Automated Identification Division System
ANS	 Automated Name Search
ATS	 Automated Technical Search
ATSPS
	
Automated Technical Search Pilot System
AUTOCOR	 Automated Correspondence Station (part of AIDS)
AUTORESP Automated Response Generation (part of AIDS)
A&R
	
Automation and Research Section of Identification Division
BER	 Bit Error Rates
BLO	 Blocking Out
CCA
	
Computerized Contributor Abbreviated Name
CCH	 Computerized Criminal History (part of NCIC)
CCN	 Computerized Criminal Name
CCNR	 Computerized Criminal Name and Record (part of AIDS)
CCR
	 Computerized Criminal (Arrest) Record (part of AIDS)
CIR
	
Computerized Ident Response File (part of AIDS)
CLASS-A	 Classification-A
CLASS-B	 Classification-B
CLASS-C	 Classification-C
CLCK	 Class ification Check
CNR	 Computerized Non-Ident Response File
COA	 Cutoff Age
CPU	 Central Processing Unit
r
^f
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k	 '
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CRS:
't
Computerized Record Sent File (part of AIDS)
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
k
CSORT Centerline Sort
DATE STP Date Stampp Count and>Log
DBMS
*
Data Base Management System
	 {
3
'	 DEDS
i
Data Entry and Display Subsystem (part of AIDS III)
	 r
DENT Data Entry
DENT-A Data Entry-Cards
DENT-B Data Entry-Documents
DOA
f
Date of Arrest (on f/p card)
	 !
I	 DOB Date of Birth (on f/p card)
ECL Emitter Coupled Logic
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
i	 ENG
t
Encode Input Data-Cards
ENCDOC Encode Input Data-Documents
ENCK Encode Check-Cards
I
ENDOCK Encode Check-Documents	 {
ERR Update Error File
r
EYE Color of Eyes (on f/p card)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEP Front End Processor
FIFO First-In-First-Out
FLAB Film Lab Processing/Computer
E
FLOAD Film Load
FPC Fingerprint Classification
FPCS
s
Fingerprint Correspondence Section o^,f the Identification..
Division
f/p
1
_Fingerprint
D-2
General Purpose Data Base Management System
Geographic Location (on f/p card)
General Purpose Simulation System
Color of Hair (on f/p card)
Height (on f/p card)
International Business Machines Corporation
Image Comparison identification
Image Comparison Regvest
Image Comparison''Subs ystem (part of AIDS IIh, actually
used for image retrieval for manual comparison)
Image Comparison Verification
Identification Division
Identification
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Thousands of Instructions per Second (as executed by a
computer)
Law Enforcement Assistance Agency
Open Mail and Sort
Image Capture Microfilm
Millions of Instructions per Second (as executed by a
computer)
Minutiae Masten File
Measures of Effectiveness
Mean Time Between Failures
Master Transaction Record
Mean Time to Repair
Name (on f/p card)
i,cv
ID, I.D.
IDENT
JPL
KIPS
GDBMS
GO
GPSS
HAI
HGT
IBM
ICI
ICRQ
ICS
LEAA
MAIL
MFILM
MIPS
MMF
MOE
MTBF
MTR
MTTR
NAM
NASA	 National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCIC	 ^ National Cx^me `Information Center	 1
D-3
1it	 9
NCR National Cash Register Company
OCA Local Identification Number (on f/p,card)
OCR Optical Character Recognition 	 {
OMB Office of Managemeut and Budget
1
ORI Originating Agency Identification Dumber (on f/p card)
PCN' Process Control Number
PICS PCN and Image Capture Subsystem (part of AIDS III)
PMT Photomultiplier Tubes
POB Place of Birth (on f/p card)
QC Quality Contr',o1 u
QUERY on-Line Query	 aj
RAN Race (on f/p card)
READ Quality Control Check, Read, Annotate
RFI
J
Radio Frequency Interference
a
RH Relative Humidity	
j
RVF Ridge Valley Filter
SACS Semi-Automatic Classification System
I
SAR Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader
SEAR Search Review i
SEX Reported :hex of a Subject (on f/p card)
SID State Identification Number
SKN Skin Tone (on f/p card)
SOC Social Security Number (on f/p card)
SPM Search Processor Module
SS System Supervisor Subsystem (part of AIDS III)
0 O 5b'	 t S	 hMd Iu Jec	 earc	 o d e	 d
SSRG	 Subject Search and Response Generation Subsystem (part of
AIDS III)
i
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AAW
t
^j	 I
TDFA Top Down Functional Analysis
TFC Technical File Conversion
TR Transaction Record	 a
TRC
r°
Transaction Control File
TSS Technical Search Subsystem (part of AMI 112)
TTL Transistor - Transistor Logic
VDENT-A Verify Data Entry-Cards
VDENT-B Verify Data Entry-Documents
VLSI Very Large Scale Integration
WAND Wand Out of System
